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Abstract More	than	two	decades		of	scholarship	on	global	value	chains	(GVCs)	has	reshaped	our	understanding	of	the	global	economy	while	tracking	the	international	fragmentation	of	productive	process	and	its	socioeconomic	consequences.	 In	this	paper	we	focus	on	the	effort	 by	 lead	 firms	 to	 capture	 market	 power	 in	 the	 provision	 of	 and	 production	 of	
intangible	 assets.	 	 The	 analysis	 builds	 on	 Pagano’s	 (2014)	 notion	 of	 “intellectual	monopoly”,	 where	 government	 protections	 of	 intellectual	 property	 have	 the	 effect	 of	locking	 in	 the	 monopoly	 power	 from	 intangible	 asset	 creation.	 We	 extend	 it	 to	 the	presence	of	scale	economies	and	network	externalities	associated	with	the	production	of	intangible	assets.		
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1. Introduction		More	than	two	decades		of	scholarship	on	global	value	chains	(GVCs)	has	reshaped	our	understanding	of	the	global	economy	while	tracking	the	international	fragmentation	of	productive	 process	 and	 its	 socioeconomic	 consequences	 for	 both	 developing	 and	developed	 countries	 (Bair,	 2009;	 Gereffi	 et	 al.,	 2005;	 Milberg	 and	 Winckler,	 2013;	Taglioni	and	Winkler,	2016;	Timmer	et	al.,	2014).			Global	value	chain	analysis	has	largely	focused	on	production	of	tangible	goods.		And	the	great	 expansion	of	GVCs	 --	 a	driving	 force	of	 globalization	 --	 is	 often	 attributed	 to	 the	drop	in	value	added	from	fabrication	and	assembly	and	the	relative	rise	in	value	added	coming	 from	 pre-	 and	 post-fabrication	 activites,	 including	 design,	 R&D,	 marketing,	finance	and	after-sales	service.	 	The	general	picture	 is	captured	 in	the	commonly-used	smiling	curve,		and	presented	in	Figure	1.	 	The	shift	from	the	relatively	flat	smile	curve	across	 the	 full	 process	 of	 producing	 value	 in	 the	 “1970s”,	 to	 a	 steep	 one	 in	 the	more	recent	period,	 is	attributed	 to	 the	massive	rise	of	productive	capacity	globally	and	 the	lowering	of	the	cost	of	managing	such	global	production.				
Figure	1:	The	smile	curve,	1970s	vs.	21st	century	(Authors’	elaboration	based	on	Shih,	1996)	
		Much	attention	has	been	given	to	how	GVCs	involve	the	expansion	of	low-cost	supplier	networks,	in	which	value	added	is	low.		This	is	seen	as	the	dip	in	the	middle	of	the	smile	curve	as	shown	in	the	Figure.		Less	attention	has	been	paid	to	the	effort	by	lead	firms	to	raise	 the	 value	 added	 in	 the	 non-fabrication	 and	 assembly	 parts	 of	 the	 production	
		 4	
process	and	even	to	specialize	in	services	which	do	not	require	such	a	dip	in	the	middle	of	the	curve.				In	this	paper	we	focus	specifically	on	the	effort	by	lead	firms	to	capture	market	power	in	the	 provision	 of	 and	 production	 of	 intangible	 assets.	 	 The	 analysis	 builds	 on	 Pagano’s	(2014)	notion	of	“intellectual	monopoly”,	where	government	protections	of	intellectual	property	 have	 the	 effect	 of	 locking	 in	 the	 monopoly	 power	 from	 intangible	 asset	creation.	We	extend	it	to	“information	rents”	(Foley,	2013)	arising	from	the	presence	of	scale	economies	and	network	externalities	associated	with	the	production	of	intangible	assets.			Network	externalities	and	scale	economies	are	international	in	scope,	so	it	is	important	to	 put	 the	 analysis	 of	 intellectual	monopoly	within	 the	 context	 of	 	 international	 trade	and	international	trade	agreements.		The	GVC	framework,	with	its	emphasis	on	market	structures	and	the	 international	distribution	of	value	added,	 is	particularly	well-suited	for	studying	the	impact	of	IPRs	and	intangibles	related	network	dynamics.		Our	 analysis	 is	 illustrated	by	numerous	 cases	 provided	by	 the	 business	 and	 academic	literature	 and	 informed	 by	 original	 stylized	 facts	 elaborated	 using	 Compustat,	 World	Input	Output	(WIOT)	and	Design	of	Trade	Agreements	(DESTA)	Databases	in	addition	to	information	available	from	international	organizations.			The	 second	 section	 introduces	 and	 contextualizes	 the	 concepts	 of	 intangibles	 and	intellectual	 monopoly	 and	 presents	 the	 hypothesis	 of	 endogenous	 asymmetries	 of	market	 structure	 in	 GVCs	 with	 intangibles.	 The	 third	 section	 shows	 the	 parallel	expansion	of	intellectual	property	rights	and	GVC	trade.	Trade	agreements	are	no	longer	mainly	 about	 traditional	 trade	 restrictions	 but	 aim	 at	 deeper	 integration	 between	countries	 through	 regulatory	 standards	 convergence	 (Rodrik,	 2018),	 in	 particular	intellectual	 property	matters,	 which	 we	 show	 are	 closely	 related	 to	 the	 expansion	 of	GVCs.	The	fourth	section	explains	the	role	of	network	complementarities	and	scalability	of	intangibles	in	fostering	monopolization	dynamics	in	GVCs.	The	fifth	section	discusses	the	 implications	 of	 our	 analysis	 for	 development	 prospects	 in	 developing	 and	 high	income	economies.	Section	6	concludes.		
2. Conceptual	framework		Within	 the	 GVC	 literature,	 numerous	works	 have	 examined	 some	 aspect	 of	 the	 rising	importance	of	knowledge	management	and	 intangible	assets,	 including	 the	 interaction	between	 innovation	 systems	 and	 GVCs	 (Lee	 and	 Malerba,	 2017;	 Pietrobelli	 and	Rabellotti,	 2011),	 and	 the	 limitations	 of	 knowledge	 transfers	 between	 multinational	corporations	 (MNCs)	 and	 local	 suppliers	 in	 developing	 economies	 (Saliola	 and	 Zanfei,	2009).	Case	studies	have	observed	 that	 the	capture	of	value	added	 is	 largely	detached	
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from	the	 flow	of	physical	goods	and	mainly	related	 to	 intangible	aspects	of	 the	supply	chain,	 in	 particular	 in	 the	 case	 of	 smartphones	 (Ali-Yrkkö	 et	 al.,	 2011;	Kraemer	 et	 al.,	2011,	Sturgeon,	2013).	Heintz	(2006)	builds	a	theoretical	model	of	oligopoly	rents	from	branding	 and	 implications	 for	 economic	 development.	 	 Recent	 empirical	 work	 on	intangibles	and	GVCs	at	the	industry	level	indicates	that	the	share	of	intangibles	in	the	value	of	final	products	has	increased	from	2000	onward.	Moreover,	it	shows	a	growing	concentration	of	intangibles	in	lead	segments	of	the	chains,	i.e.	in	the	distribution	stage	for	buyer-driven	GVCs	and	 in	activities	before	the	 final	production	stage	 for	producer-driven	GVCs	(Timmer	et	al.,	2017).		All	these	works	suggest	that	increasingly	the	economic	dynamics	of	GVCs	depend	on	the	function	of	intangible	assets.		Nonetheless,	to	the	best	of	our	knowledge,	there	has	been	no	systematic	treatment	from	a	theoretical	or	historical	perspective	of	intangible	assets	in	 the	 understanding	 of	 GVCs	 or,	 more	 broadly,	 of	 the	 relation	 between	 trade	 and	economic		development.			
2.1. Intangibles	and	monopolization	in	the	digital	age		The	 growing	 relevance	 of	 intangibles	 for	 the	 functioning	 of	 our	 contemporary	economies	has	attracted	much	 interest	 in	 the	recent	years	 (Haskel	&	Westlake,	2018).	Intangibles	 are	 nonfinancial	 assets	 that	 lack	 a	 physical	 substance,	 are	 non-rival	 in	consumption	 and	 are	 at	 least	 partially	 appropriable.	 Computerized	 information,	technological	 know-how,	 artistic	 original	 arts,	 design	 and	 new	 products,	 brands,	employer-provided	 training	 and	 organizational	 structure	 are	 among	 the	main	 kind	 of	intangibles	 (Corrado	 et	 al.,	 2012).	 Such	 intangibles	 are	 not	 a	 new	 phenomenon.		Friedrich	List,	writing	in	the	mid-19th	century,	identified	“intellectual	capital”	as	part	of	the	“productive	forces”	that	lay	the	ground	for	the	production	of	value	and	the	growth	of	firms	 and	 countries	 (List,	 1856,	 chap.	 2).	 	However,	 the	 conditions	 for	 the	production	and	 consumption	 of	 intangibles	 has	 	 changed	 radically	 in	 the	 past	 20	 years,	with	 the	massive	 reduction	 of	 computation,	 communication	 and	 data	 storage,	 intangible	 assets	have	defined	the	modern	“information	economy.”	(Nordhaus,	2015,	p.	4)		The	growing	role	of		intangible	assets	is	limited	by	the	strengthening	and	broadening	of	intellectual	property	rights	regulations	(IPRs)	that	restrict	their	uses	in	production	and	consumption.	 According	 to	 the	 World	 International	 Property	 Organization,	 IPRs	comprise	 copyrights	 on	 artistic	 and	 scientific	 works,	 industrial	 property	 such	 as	trademarks,	and	patents	on	new	inventions.	These	IPRs	ascribe	the	legal	right	to	control	the	use	of	the	intangibles	they	describe	to	their	sole	legal	owner.	Not	all	intangibles	can	be	covered	by	IPRs,	but	the	scope	of	IPRs	hase	expanded	over	time.				The	 issue	 of	 intellectual	 monopoly	 gained	 prominence	 in	 the	 late	 1990s.	 Intellectual	monopoly	is	defined	as	“the	power	of	producers	of	ideas	to	control	how	their	products	
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are	used”	(Boldrin	and	Levine,	2004,	p.	328).	Pagano	(2014)	argues	that	the	tightening	of	property	rights	has	created	a	new	era	--	intellectual	monopoly	capitalism	–	in	which	“monopoly	is	not	simply	based	on	the	market	power	due	to	the	concentration	of	skills	in	machines	 and	 management;	 it	 becomes	 also	 a	 legal	 monopoly	 over	 some	 items	 of	knowledge”.	This	monopolization	has	dramatic	 consequences,	 since	 “knowledge	 is	not	an	 object	 defined	 in	 a	 limited	 physical	 space	 (…)	 the	 full-blown	 private	 ownership	 of	knowledge	 means	 a	 global	 monopoly	 that	 limits	 the	 liberty	 of	 many	 individuals	 in	multiple	 locations”	 (Pagano,	 2014,	 p.	 1413).	 IPR	 rents	 have	 been	 found	 to	 be	 highly	unequally	distributed	(Foley,	2013,	Aguiar	de	Medeiros	&	Trebat,	2017),	and	even	to	be	associated	 with	 a	 slowdown	 in	 firm	 investment	 as	 would	 be	 predicted	 by	 standard	monopoly	 analysis	 but	 which	 also	 follows	 Steindl’s	 (1952)	 notion	 of	 maturity	 and	stagnation	(Pagano	and	Rossi,	2009).			The	problem	of	intellectual	monopoly	is	not	limited	to	the	issue	of	IP	and	must	account	for	 the	 economics	 of	 intangibles	 more	 generally.	 Indeed,	 natural	 monopoly	 market	structure	emerges	under	various	combination	of	(1)	scale	economies	arising	from	high	fixed	 costs	 and	 low	 or	 zero	 variable	 costs	 and	 (2)	 network	 externalities	 and	complementarities	 (Mosca,	 2008)(Haskel	 &	 Westlake,	 2018,	 Chapter	 4).	 	 Numerous	studies	have	found	these	features	present	in	internet	companies	(Haucap	&	Heimeshoff,	2014;	 Khan,	 2016)	 and	 they	 have	 been	 discussed	 in	 the	 context	 of	 multiple-sided	markets	(Rochet	&	Tirole,	2006;	Tirole,	2017,	Chapter	14).			The	 spectacular	 growth	 in	 revenue	 of	 the	 leading	 online	 platforms	 -	 e.g.	 Facebook,	Google,	Amazon	in	the	US	and	Tencent	and	Alibaba	in	China	–	in	recent	years	illustrates	the	 significant	 	 first-mover	 advantages	 and	 the	 enormous	 returns	 to	 scale	 (Figure	 2).	Once	 the	 internet	 	 platform	 is	 in	 place,	with	 its	 related	 services	 available	 for	 the	 first	customer,	 the	 marginal	 cost	 of	 expanding	 to	 even	 a	 billion	 customers	 is	 limited	 or	negligible.	The	situation	is	compounded	by	the	fact	that	consumers	benefit	from	having	a	single	platform,	such	as	Facebook	or	WeChat	(Tencent),	implying	that	these	firms	are	close	 to	 natural	 monopolies.	 The	 dilemma	 of	 a	 natural	 monopoly	 is	 of	 course	 that	 it	requires	regulation	rather	than	antitrust	policy	(Boyd,	2013,	pp.	1635–1658)	a	point	we	return	to	in	the	conclusion.	The	EU	antitrust	case	against	Google	is	based	on	its	excessive	control	over	downstream	markets,	and	not	its	monopoly	position	per	se	(Daly,	2017).			
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Figure	2:	Revenue	of	main	online	platforms	(2013-2017)	
			
2.2. Intangibles	and	coordination	of	global	value	chains		Intellectual	monopoly	is	not	limited	to	internet	companies	although	in	the	study	of	GVCs	it	 is	acknowledged	that	the	ICT	revolution	was	in	part	responsible	for	their	expansion.		Baldwin	(2016)	advances	the	concept	of	the	“second	unbundling”	in	order	to	stress	that	ICT	 revolution	boosted	 globalization	by	 relaxing	 the	 communication	 constraint,	which	means	 that	manufacturing	 processes	 could	 be	 dispersed	 internationally	without	 huge	efficiency	losses	(the	first	unbundling	was	the	period	of	expanding	final	goods	trade	in	the	 19th	 century).	 	 However,	 Baldwin	 indicates	 that	 international	 fragmentation	 of	production	 “didn’t	 end	 the	 need	 to	 coordinate	 the	 various	 stages	 of	 production	 –	 it	internationalized	it.	Thus	to	ensure	the	operation	operated	as	one,	the	offshoring	firms	moved	 their	managerial,	marketing,	 and	 technical	know-how	along	with	 the	offshored	stages”	(Baldwin,	2016,	p.	134).	The	“need	to	coordinate”	activities	previously	carried	on	in-house	 by	 big	 corporations	 corresponds	 to	 a	 new	 challenge	 for	 management,	 the	integration	of	business	and	labor	processes	distributed	among	a	variety	of	locations	and	legal	systems.				Sociological	 research	 on	 outsourcing	 and	 relocation	 confirms	 that	 increased	fragmentation	 and	 spatial	 dispersion	 of	 the	 production	 process	 results	 in	 a	 need	 for	coordination.	 For	 Ramioul	 and	 Van	 Hootegem	 “the	 decoupled	 tasks	 involved	 in	producing	 a	 single	 order	 or	 customer	 request	 remained	 interdependent.	 Decoupled	tasks	 need	 to	 be	 linked	 and	 coordinated	 in	 order	 to	 secure	 seamless	 processes”.	However,	 “remote	 communication	 and	 interventions	 are	more	 complex	 and	 prone	 to	misunderstanding	than	collocated	interaction”	(Ramioul	&	Van	Hootegem,	2015,	p.	108).	There	 are	 also	 implications	 for	 workers	 who	 may	 be	 confronted	 with	 the	 loss	 of	 a	comprehensive	 overview	 of	 the	 workflow	 and	 lack	 the	 resources	 to	 resolve	 new	problems	arising	from	the	dispersion.	In	order	to	address	these	new	vulnerabilities	and	
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preserve	the	integrity	of	the	labor	process,	ICT	tools	are	implemented	while	procedures	and	processes	are	increasingly	formalized	and	standardized.	To	realize	the	matching	of	production	teams	and	ideas,	GVC	integration	requires	a	dense	circulation	of	information	flows	to	communicate	specifications,	standards,	technical	know-how	in	addition	to	costs	and	other	items	(Gereffi,	Humphrey,	&	Sturgeon,	2005).		The	expansion	of	GVC	trade	is	thus	linked	to	a	rising	mobilization	and	circulation	of	intangible	assets.		
2.3. Endogenous	asymmetries	of	market	structures	with	intangibles	Milberg	 and	Winkler	 (2013)	 propose	 that	 the	 polarization	 between,	 on	 the	 one	 hand,	oligopolistic	 lead	 firms	 at	 the	 top	 with	 markup	 pricing	 power	 and	 concentration	 of	industry	 and,	 on	 the	 other	 hand,	 intense	 competition	 among	 the	 lower-tier	 suppliers	constitutes	 an	 “endogenous	 asymmetry	 of	 market	 structures”	 (Milberg	 and	 Winkler,	2013,	pp.	123–130).	They	point	to	global	competition	as	the	central	mechanism:	as	more	developing	 countries	 enter	 lower-	 and	medium-tech	 industries	 in	 manufacturing	 and	services,	 lead	firms	are	able	to	induce	competition	among	their	suppliers.	Indeed,	with	abundant	labor	and	excess	productive	capacity	globally	at	their	disposal,	lead	firms	are	able	to	pit	suppliers	against	one	another.	The	situation	also	allows	lead	firms	to	offload	productive	risks	to	suppliers.		The	so-called	“smile	curve”1	offers	a	stylized	representation	of	the	distribution	of	value-added	 share	 in	 GVCs,	 in	 which	 heightened	 global	 competition	 in	 fabrication	 leads	 to	deepening	of	the	curve,	limiting	possibilities	to	capture	value	at	the	central	assembling-executing	segment	of	the	product	formation	(Figure	3).	This	deepening	of	the	curve	can	result	from	a	simple	cost	accounting	effect	(Baldwin,	2012,	pp.	18–19):	if	a	stage’s	cost	is	reduced	by	offshoring,	its	share	in	value	added	falls	since	a	stage’s	value	added	is	based	on	costs,	and	prominently	labor	costs.	But	this	cost-accounting	effect	is	both	fueled	and	amplified	by	changes	in	relative	market	power.			The	induced	competition	among	suppliers	acts	effectively	as	competition	among	labor.	Workers	must	 compete	 against	 unemployed	workers	 in	 their	 home	market	 as	well	 as	against	workers	across	geographically	dispersed	 labor	markets.	The	ability	of	workers	to	stand	 together	and	bargain	collectively	 for	a	higher	share	of	 income	 is	dramatically	weakened	 by	 the	 fragmentation	 strategy	 of	 transnational	 corporations	 (Peoples	 &	Sugden,	 2000).	 As	 summarized	 by	 Nathan	 and	 Sarkar	 (2011):	 “The	 splintering	 of	production	 and	 outsourcing	 of	 tasks	 enables	 employers	 to	 utilize	 to	 the	 fullest	 the	segmentation	 of	 the	 labour	 force,	 and	 that	 too	 on	 a	 global	 scale.	Workers	 in	 different	production	units	perform	different	 tasks	and	are	paid	according	 to	 their	performance,	with	no	reference	to	the	final	product	to	which	the	workers	contribute.	In	fact,	 further	down	the	chain	of	subcontracting,	the	workers	might	not	even	know	the	final	product,	branded	 or	 otherwise,	 to	which	 they	 contribute”	 (Nathan	&	 Sarkar,	 2011,	 p.	 54).	 The																																																									1	This	representation,	originally	used	by	Acer’s	founder	Stan	Shih	(Shih,	1996)	to	illustrate	challenges	for	Taiwanese	industries	in	the	IT	sector,	is	extremely	widely	used	to	illustrate	GVCs	dynamics	in	case	studies	and	macro-research.	
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decline	in	the	wage	share	in	numerous	countries	that	accompanied	the	expansion	of	GVC	trade	 between	 1995	 and	 200	 is	 consistent	 with	 this	 weakening	 of	 labor	 bargaining	power	position	due	to	 the	segmentation	of	 the	workforce	(Milberg	and	Winkler,	2013,	(Timmer,	Erumban,	Los,	Stehrer,	&	de	Vries,	2014,	pp.	106–109).		Intellectual	monopoly	reinforces	the	deepening	of	the	smile	curve	depicted	in	Figure	3.	Rather	than	placing	further	downward	pressure	in	the	middle	of	the	curve,	intellectual	monopoly	points	to	the	upward	pressure	at	both	ends	of	the	curve,	where	control	over	intangible	assets	is	concentrated.	We	contend	that	this	upward	pressure	on	each	side	of	the	 curve	 comes	 from	 dynamics	 arising	 from	 the	 growing	 role	 of	 intangible	 assets	 in	chain	 dynamics	 and	 from	 tighter	 IPRs.	 	 That	 is,	 the	 market	 power	 of	 lead	 firms	 is	enhanced	 by	 intellectual	 monopoly,	 which	 is	 fueled	 by	 a	 combination	 of	 dynamic	advantages	 arising	 from	 GVCs	 network	 externalities	 and	 increasing	 returns	 on	intangibles	 and	 legally-enforced	 proprietary	 control	 over	 standards,	 technologies	 and	brands.	 The	 remainder	 of	 the	 paper	 discusses	 these	 two	 sources	 of	 intellectual	monopoly	in	the	context	of	GVCs.			
Figure	3:	Intellectual	monopoly	versus	global	competition	in	the	smile	curve	(Authors	elaboration	based	on	
Shih,	1996)	
	
	
3. The	 simultaneous	 expansion	 of	 intellectual	 property	 rights	 and	
global	value	chains		GVC	trade	expanded	rapidly	beginning	in	the	1990s	and	at	the	same	time	that	the	major	industrialized	 countries	 began	 to	 include	 intellectual	 property	 protections	 in	 trade	agreements.	 	The	share	of	foreign	value	added	in	the	exports	of	the	largest	 	economies	
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and	 their	 neighbors	 increased	 markedly	 (Figure	 4).	 China	 shows	 a	 decline	 in	 this	measure	over	 the	 second	half	 of	 the	period,	 an	 indication	 that	 that	production	 can	be	“upgraded”	 to	 capture	 more	 value	 domestically	 (Kee	 and	 Tang,	 2016).	 Mexico’s	trajectory	 suggests	 that	perhaps	 there	 is	 an	upward	 limit	 to	 fragmentation.	Aggregate	WIOT	data	at	the	industry/country	level	confirms	the	general	tendency	in	Figure	4	with	an	 average	 foreign	 value	 added	 in	 gross	 exports	 (excluding	 mining	 and	 refined	petroleum)	that	rose	from	around	19%	in	the	early	2000s	up	to	23%	a	decade	later	for	the	world	 (Figure	 5),	 a	 phenomenon	 slightly	more	 important	 in	 advanced	 economies	than	in	the	rest	of	the	world.			This	period	of	GVC	expansion	coincides	with	a	growing	emphasis	on	the	tightening	of	IP	regulations	 in	 international	 trade	 agreements.	 The	 1980s	 represented	 a	 period	 of	dramatic	 change	 in	 the	 U.S.	 intellectual	 property	 law	 (Coriat	 and	 Orsi,	 2002;	 Hunt,	1999).	Mounting	worries	in	business	and	policy-making	circles	about	the	deterioration	of	 US	 comparative	 advantage	 in	 high-technology	 industries	 inspired	 a	 series	 of	regulatory	and	institutional	changes	aimed	at	protecting	US	intellectual	property.	They	resulted	 in	 enlarged	 patentability	 of	 research	 results,	 in	 particular	 concerning	 IT	software	 and	 in	 biotech,	 and	 stricter	 enforcement	 of	 intellectual	 property	 rights.	 The	outcome	was	a	surge	in	the	number	of	intellectual	property	applications.	This	IP	frenzy	has	 become	 a	 global	 phenomenon	 since	 the	 turn	 of	 the	millennium.	 According	 to	 the	World	 Intellectual	 Property	 Organization	 patents	 and	 industrial	 design	 filings	worldwide	 tripled	 between	 2001	 and	 2015	 and	 trademarks	 applications	 more	 than	doubled	over	the	same	period	(WIPO,	2016).				
Figure	4:	Foreign	Value-added	in	exports	of	the	7	biggest	economies,	Mexico	and	Poland	(1995-2011)	
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Figure	5:	Industries	foreign	value	added	in	gross	export	by	country	grouping	
				
3.1. The	internationalization	of	IP	regulation	through	trade	agreements	Stricter	IPRs	at	the	national	and	international	level	support	the	expansion	of	GVC-based	trade.		Since	the	1880s,	the	Paris	and	Berne	Conventions	–	currently	administered	by	the	World	 Intellectual	 Property	 Organization	 (WIPO)	 -	 set	 some	 standards	 in	 terms	 of	protection	 of	 industrial	 intellectual	 property	 and	 artistic	 works.	 However,	 their	implementation	 has	 been	 problematic	 and	 no	 IP	 case	 has	 ever	 been	 subjected	 to	 the	International	 Court	 of	 Justice.	 In	 the	 late	 1970s,	 US	 IP-based	 industries	 realized	 that	
their competitive advantage was vulnerable as technological change made replication 
of their software, recorded music, videos, and pharmaceuticals increasingly easier and 
cheaper, in the absence of credible institutional means to sanction IP appropriators in 
developing countries. In the 1980s, they successfully lobbied the US government to 
use threats of unilateral trade sanctions to force developing countries to increase their 
IP protection and enlisted business associations in Europe and Japan to oppose what 
began to be framed as “ piracy” and in favor of a stricter international IP regime. (Sell 
& Prakash, 2004, pp. 154–160). 	
Intellectual	property		in	the	multilateral	trade	agenda	Beginning	 in	 the	 mid-1980s,	 a	 mounting	 number	 of	 IP	 conflicts	 between	 the	 US	 or	European	Community,	on	the	one	hand,	and	developing	countries,	on	the	other	hand,	led	to	 unilateral	 redress	 under	 national	 laws.	 For	 example,	 in	 1988	 President	 Reagan	decided	 to	 impose	 increased	 import	 duties	 of	 100	 percent	 ad	 valorem	 on	 certain	products	 of	 Brazil	 due	 to	 the	 Brazilian	 government’s	 failure	 “to	 provide	 process	 and	
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product	patent	protection	for	pharmaceutical	products	and	fine	chemicals,	and	that	this	failure	 is	 unreasonable	 and	 constitutes	 a	 burden	 or	 restriction	 on	 U.S.	 commerce”	(Reagan,	 1988).	 Facing	 trade	 retaliation,	 developing	 countries	 agreed	 to	 include	 IP	 in	international	 trade	 negotiations.	 	 A	 new	 intellectual	 property	 regime	 began	 to	 spread	beyond	 the	 US	 borders	 with	 an	 IP	 chapter	 of	 the	 the	 North	 America	 Free	 Trade	Agreement	 (NAFTA)	 in	1994	and,	 the	 following	year,	 the	agreement	on	Trade-Related	Aspects	of	Intellectual	Property	Rights	(TRIPS)	within	World	Trade	Organization.			As	noted	by	US	congressional	officials,	NAFTA	was		“the	most	comprehensive	free	trade	agreement	 (FTA)	 negotiated	 at	 the	 time”	 and	 served	 as	 a	 template	 for	 the	 new	generation	of	FTAs	that	the	United	States	later	negotiated,	and	for	certain	provisions	in	multilateral	 trade	 negotiations	 as	 part	 of	 the	 Uruguay	 Round	 (Villareal	 &	 Fergusson,	2017).	With	NAFTA	and	TRIPS,	for	the	first	time,	international	treaties	would	subject	IP	standards	 to	 effective	 dispute	 settlement,	 i.e.	 “compulsory	 third-party	 arbitration,	including	 a	 final	 ruling	 requiring	 treaty	 compliance	 and	 a	 procedure	 to	 enforce	decisions”	(Hertz,	1997,	p.	267).	Under	the	NAFTA,	intellectual	property	disputes	can	be	settled	 with	 the	 dedicated	 state-to-state	 mechanism,	 but	 because	 the	 agreement	 also	protects	 IPRs	 as	 “intangible	 property”,	 the	 IP	 owner	 has	 the	 additional	 possibility	 of	bringing	 the	 host	 state	 into	 binding	 international	 arbitration.	 Under	 the	 TRIPS	agreement,	 the	Dispute	Settlement	Understanding,	originally	designed	for	trade	issues,	is	applied	to	IP	disputes.	This	means	that	the	complainant,	if	found	in	the	right,	could	be	allowed	 to	 retaliate	 by	 using	 restrictions	 on	 imports	 against	 the	 party	 violating	 IP	standards	 (Kennedy,	 2016).	 In	 addition	 to	 this	 settlement	mechanism,	 the	 TRIPS	 give	some	guidelines	for	the	enforcement	of	IPRs,	resulting	in	the	introduction	of	some	sorts	of	IP	protection	in	most	parts	of	the	world	(von	Lewinski,	2016).	Some	Latin	American	countries	did	not	have	pharmaceuticals	patents	as	of	 the	 late	1980s,	but	 these	patents	are	 now	 standard	 everywhere,	 although	 there	 remain	 differences	 across	 countries	 in	terms	of	such	issues	as	the	duration	of	exclusivity	or	the	possibilities	to	use	test	data	and	compulsory	licenses	(Shadlen,	2017).			The	 2001	 Doha	 declaration	 asserts	 that	 WTO	members	 may	 have	 some	 flexibility	 in	implementing	TRIPS	agreement	 in	a	way	that	protects	public	health.	This	statement	 is	consistent	with	 the	 fact	 that	 the	 TRIPS	 agreement	 only	 requires	 countries	 to	 provide	“minimum”	standard	of	intellectual	property	protection,	which	permits	compliance	with	TRIPS	while	also	recognizing	 the	 legitimate	pursuit	of	domestic	priorities.	 	China	used	this	 flexibility	 to	 preserve	 some	 developmental	 space	 to	 sustain	 its	 catching-up	 as	 it	joined	WTO	 in	 2001.	 	 The	 Chinese	 have	 since	 adopted	 a	 domestic	 IP	 framework	 and	strengthended	it	over	time.	(Yu,	2017)2.	However,	as	the	Chinese	economy	expands	and	its	share	of	world	trade	grows,	the	US	has	become	increasingly	hostile	towards	China	on																																																									2	 Chinese	 authorities	 are	 not	 challenging	 the	 western	 narrative	 about	 IP	 protection.	 For	 example,	 a	Siemens	 IP	 executive	 quoted	 approvingly	 the	 Chinese	 Minister	 of	 Science,and	 Technology	 as	 saying:	"Patent	protection	is	the	respect	for	human	work.	Whoever	created	a	patent	and	worked	hard	for	it	must	be	
able	to	protect	the	result.	If	someone	steals	it,	he	violates	a	fundamental	right."	(Ma,	2008).	
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issues	of	IP	protection.	Businesses	and	government	officials	point	to	China	as	the	main	culprit	globally	of	“IP	theft”	related	to	counterfeit	tangible	goods,	pirated	software,	theft	of	 trade	 secrets	 and	 forced	 technology	 transfers	 with	 estimated	 losses	 of	 several	hundred	 billions	 of	 US	 dollars	 per	 annum	 (Blair	 et	 al.,	 2017;	 USTR,	 2017).	 It	 is	 not	evident	that	China	violates	any	WTO	IPR	norms,	even	if	a	previous	dispute	in	this	arena	resulted	in	amendments	of	the	Chinese	Copyright	Law	and	revision	the	Regulations	for	Customs	 Protection	 of	 IPRs	 (WTO,	 2010).	 The	 	 Trump	 administration	 has	 retaliated	against	China,	with	action	under	section	301	of	the	US	Trade	Act	of	1974	which	provides	the	 U.S.	 executive	 branch	 with	 the	 authority	 to	 respond	 to	 certain	 foreign	 “unfair”	practices	 not	 covered	 by	 trade	 agreement,	 with	 a	 WTO	 petition	 against	 Chinese	 	 IP	infringement,	and	with	threats	of	additional	actions	against	Chinese	exports	to	the	US.			
Strengthening	IPRs	through	preferential	trade	agreements	The	contention	over	IPRs	exemplified	by	the	dispute	between	the	US	and	China,	reflects	the	heightened	sensitivity	of	the	US	and	other	high-income	economies	to	IPRs	in	an	era	where	their	governments	and	businesses	consider	innovation	as	their	main	competitive	advantage.		The	US	today	is	the	leader	of	the	movement	toward	stricter	international	IP	norms,	 in	 contrast	 to	 its	 position	 in	 earlier	 periods	 (Peng,	 Ahlstrom,	 Carraher,	 &	 Shi,	2017).	It	is	the	most	active	complainant	at	the	WTO	under	the	TRIPS	agreement	but,	as	illustrated	by	the	recent	actions	of	the	Trump	administration,	TRIPS	is	not	enough	(Sell,	2010).	The	US	seeks	other	ways	to	extend	internationally	the	standard	of	IP	protection	found	 in	 U.S.	 law	 and	 in	 particular	 to	 apply	 existing	 IP	 protection	 to	 digital	 media	(Akhtar	&	Ferguson,	2011,	p.	25).			In	order	to	circumvent	the	flexibility	in	the	WTO	TRIPS	Agreement,	and	the	reluctance	of	 developing	 countries	 at	 the	WTO	 to	 raise	WTO	 standards	 of	 IP	 protection	 (Helfer,	2004),	 developed	 economies	 have	 relied	 increasingly	 on	 bilateral	 	 and	 regional	preferential	 trade	 agreements	 (PTAs)	 to	 accomplish	 the	 objective	 of	 securing	intellectual	property	related	economic	advantages	(Abbott,	2006;	Shadlen,	2008).			The	 international	 intellectual	 property	 policymaking	 arena	 has	 grown	 ever	 more	complex	with	overlapping	transnational	norms.	For	example,	the	33	pages	of	the	chapter	dedicated	to	IPRs	in	the	US-CAFTA	agreement	details	the	treaties	and	conventions	that	the	 parties	 shall	 ratify,	 which	 defines	 precisely	 and	 extensively	 the	 scope	 of	 IPRs	concerned	 (copyrights,	 performance,	 patents,	 communication,	 trademarks,	 plants,	microorganisms,	 industrial	 design,	 geographical	 indication,	 name	 domains…).	Additionally,	 it	 describes	 enforcement	 mechanisms	 to	 be	 implemented	 in	 national	legislation	 and	 considers	 supplementary	 protection	 of	 intellectual	 property	 under	 the	investment	 chapter	 (CAFTA,	 2004).	 IP	 provisions	 included	 in	 Japanese	 and	 EU	international	 trade	agreements	are	more	general	but	 they	also	provide	supplementary	coverage	and	additional	obligations	(Liberti,	2010).	Moreover,	 investment	 treaties	and	chapters	dedicated	to	investment	protection	in	trade	agreements	open	additional	routes	
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for	 IP	protection,	which	 can	exercise	 a	powerful	 chilling	effect	on	government	 actions	via	the	exposure	to	the	risk	of	costly	investor-state	arbitration	disputes	(Ho,	2015,	2016;	Kasolowsky	&	Leikin,	2017).			The	DESTA	database	 (Dür	 et	 al.,	 2014)	 allows	us	 to	 track	 this	 qualitative	 evolution	 in	bilateral	 and	 regional	 trade	 agreements.	 IP	 provisions	 of	 trade	 agreements	 were	nonexistent	before	 the	North	American	Free	Trade	Agreement	 (NAFTA)	was	signed	 in	1992.	 	 They	 became	 a	 standard	 feature	 of	 trade	 agreements	 in	 the	 2000s.	 	 Figure	 6	shows	the	number	of	PTAs	signed	each	year	and	of	those,	the	ones	which	included	IPRs.		It	also	shows	the	percentage	of	PTAs	with	an	IP	provision.	 	By	2016,	every	PTA	signed	included	an	IP	provision.			The	 US,	 its	 close	 Latin	 American	 allies	 and	 European	 countries	 were	 the	 first	 to	 be	involved,	but	the	movement	spread-out	in	Asia	in	the	2000s,	as	Japan	and	China	engaged	in	several	PTAs	with	IP	provisions	(see	Figure	7).	Although	China	is	still	not	involved	in	any	such	agreement	with	the	US	or	the	EU,	it	has	signed	in	2014	and	2015	agreements	containing	 comprehensive	 chapters	 on	 IPRs	 with	 Australia,	 Switzerland	 and	 Korea,	which	 signals	 a	 Chinese	 convergence	 towards	 the	 strict	 international	 IP	 regime	championed	by	high-income	countries	(Guo,	2016).		
Figure	6:	IPRs	provisions	in	preferential	trade	agreements	(1948-2016)	
				
		 15	
Figure	7:	Countries	participating	in	at	least	one	PTA	that	includes	substantial	IPRs	provisions,	by	decade	
			
The	overwhelming	dominance	of	the	North	in	IP		The	increasing	diffusion	of	PTAs	including	IPRs	provision	indicates	a	global	tightening	of	IPRs.	However,	the	actual	content	of	IPRs	provisions	can	differs	substantially	from	one	to	another.	The	higher	level	of	IP	protection	is	provided	by	agreements	involving	the	US,	the	European	Free	Trade	association	(Iceland,	Liechtenstein,	Norway,	and	Switzerland)	and	 the	 European	Union,	while	 trade	 agreements	 including	 only	 developing	 countries	tend	 to	 have	 much	 more	 limited	 IPRs	 provisions	 (Valdés	 and	 McCann,	 2014).	 These	differences	 reflect	 the	 distinctive	motivations	 of	 developed	 and	 developing	 countries;	while	 the	 former	 aim	 at	 narrowing	 the	 gap	 between	 national	 regulatory	 policies,	 the	latter	 objective	 is	mainly	 to	 secure	 and	 stabilize	market	 access	 (Manger	 and	 Shadlen,	2014).			The	 rationale	 behind	 these	 different	 approaches	 is	 clear:	 patents	 and	 international	trademark	are	overwhelmingly	concentrated	in	developed	economies,	mainly	 in	Japan,	US	 and	 EU	 countries.	 Together,	 these	 three	 entities	 accounted	 for	 82.5%	 of	 triadic	patents	-	i.e.	patents	registered	at	the	three	major	patents	offices	(US,	EU	and	Japan)	-	in	2013	 (Figure	8).	 	This	was	actualy	a	decline	 from	a	 share	of	93%	 in	2000,	but	among	developing	countries	only	China	made	its	way	to	the	top	ten	and	still	accounts	for	 just	3,5%	of	these	patents.	International	trademarks	are	also	heavily	concentrated	by	these	three	 powers	 (Dernis	 et	 al.,	 2015,	 fig.	 2.8).	 Moreover,	 the	 OECD	 indicator	 of	 the	international	intensity	of	trademarks	relative	to	GDP	shows	that	no	developing	country	is	ranked	in	the	top	20	(Figure	9).						
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Figure	8:	Main	countries	contributing	to	Triadic	patent	families	
		
Figure	9:	International	trademarks	intensity	in	2010-2012	
		It	 is	 important	 to	 note	 that	 if	 we	 consider	 total	 patent	 filings	 in	 all	 national	 offices	worldwide,	 China	 is	 catching	 up.	 Trademarks	 and	 industrial	 design	 filings	 at	 China’s	office	took	off	in	the	1990s,	and	at	the	turn	of	the	millennium	China’s	office	became	the	largest	in	the	world	in	terms	of	applications	received.		China’s	office	also	ranks	first	for	patent	filings	since	2011.				Despite	the	gains,	Chinese	intellectual	property	does	not	match	the	quality	of	its	richer	counterparts	 (WIPO,	 2016).	 Balance	 of	 payment	 receipts	 from	 the	 use	 of	 intellectual	property	testify	to	the	continued	control	by	developed	countries.	From	the	mid-eighties	to	the	early	2010s,	the	spectacular	increase	of	international	IP	income	has	gone	mostly	
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to	industrialized	countries.		International	receipts	for	the	use	of	IP	going	to	high-income	economies	 in	 2016	were	more	 than	 100	 times	 higher	 (US$	 323	 billions)	 thank	 those	going	 to	 low-	 and	 middle-income	 countries	 (US$	 3	 billion)	 (Figure	 10).	 Moreover,	receipts	are	heavily	concentrated	in	a	handful	of	rich	countries,	the	US	alone	accounting	for	38.4	%	of	total	international	payments	in	2015	(Figure	11).		
Figure	10:	High	income	and	Low	and	Middle	Income	countries	receipts	from	the	use	of	intellectual	property	
(1970-2016)	
		
Figure	11:	Share	of	main	receiving	countries	in	total	receipts	for	the	use	of	intellectual	property	(2015)	
		In	sum,	the	stricter	IP	regime	initiated	by	the	US	in	the	early	eighties	spread	rapidly	to	Europe,	 Asia	 and	 Latin-America.	 	 The	 exception	 was	 countries	 that	 export	 mostly	primary	products	 or	 that	 are	 big	 enough	 to	 resist	 this	 agenda,	 including	Russia,	 India	
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and	Brazil.	Indeed,	IP	is	still	overwhelmingly	concentrated	in	a	few	developed	countries.	Even	 if	 China	 is	 catching	 up	 as	 it	 develops	 a	 dynamic	 domestic	 IP	 regime,	 the	international	 IP-related	 payments	 indicate	 a	 crushing	 dominance	 of	 high-income	countries,	which	 is	 both	 the	 rationale	 and	 the	 result	 of	 their	 crusade	 for	 stricter	 IPRs	over	the	past	decades.			
3.2. Historical	and	theoretical	perspectives	on	IP	regulation	and	development	The	internationalization	of	IPRs	occurred	in	spite	of	the	lack	of	substantial	evidence	in	favor	 of	 stricter	 IPRs	 for	 developing	 countries.	 The	 theoretical	 justification	 for	 IP	protection	arises	 from	market	 failures	resulting	 from	the	specificities	of	knowledge,	 to	the	extent	it	can	be	likened	to	information.	The	“indivisible	nature”	of	knowledge	entails	a	problem	of	free	riding:	because	the	benefits	are	accessible	to	everybody	while	only	the	researching	or	innovating	entity	bears	the	costs,	there	is	a	danger	of	underinvestment	in	knowledge	 production	 (Arrow,	 1962;	 Nelson,	 1959).	 	 The	 state	 must	 subsidize	knowledge	production	or	strictly	enforce	property	rights	on	products	in	order	to	obtain	a	sufficient	provision	of	knowledge.			There	 is	 not	 conclusive	 evidence	 supporting	 the	 role	 of	 tighter	 IPRs	 for	 economic	development.	Historical	research	proved	that	Douglass	North’s	hypothesis	according	to	which	 the	 rate	 of	 technological	 change	 depended	 mainly	 on	 the	 inventor's	 ability	 to	capture	a	larger	share	of	the	benefits	of	his	invention	(North,	1981)	resulted	in	a	grossly	overstated	assessment	of	the	role	of	IPRs	in	the	industrial	revolution	(Mokyr,	2009).		An	in-depth	 study	 on	 the	 effect	 of	 the	 most	 significant	 shifts	 in	 patent	 policy	 across	 60	countries	and	150	years	found	that	the	impact	of	patent	enhancing	on	applications	was	actually	negative,	suggesting	at	least	a	lack	of	positive	impact	of	strengthening	of	patents	on	innovation	(Lerner,	2009).	Research	focused	on	the	more	recent	period	established	the	 lack	 of	 any	 straightforward	 relation	 between	 stricter	 IPRs	 and	 various	 innovation	measures	(for	an	overview	see	Hudson	and	Minea,	2013;	Park,	2007)	and	show	that	the	positive	 effect	 of	 venture	 capital	 investment	 on	 firms’	 innovation	 is	 more	 effective	within	 the	 context	 of	 a	 weaker	 IP	 environment	 (Safari,	 2017).	 Assessment	 of	 the	regulatory	changes	 in	 the	US	established	 that	 the	strengthening	and	extension	of	 IPRs	had	 negative	 effects	 on	 incentives	 to	 invest,	 as	 patent	 disputes	 have	 acted	 as	 a	substantial	 impediment	 to	 innovative	 activities	 (Bessen	 and	 Meurer,	 2008,	 2006).	Overall,	 the	weight	 of	 evidence	 from	 economic	 history	 indicates	 "that	 patent	 policies,	which	 grant	 strong	 intellectual	 property	 rights	 to	 early	 generations	 of	 inventors,	may	discourage	innovation."(Moser,	2013,	p.	40).		In	 the	 context	of	development	and	 trade,	 the	globalization	of	 IPRs	 fueled	a	passionate	debate	over	the	issue	of	IPRs.		In	some	specific	cases	such	as	some	mid-quality	and	high-quality	segments	of	the	wine	industry,	labels	and	Indication	of	Geographical	Origin	can	offers	 some	 ressources	 for	 developing	 countries	 producers	 to	 control	 and	 increase	symbolic	value	of	their	products		(Ponte	&	Daviron,	2011;	Ponte	Stefano,	2009;	Staricco	
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&	Ponte,	2015).	However,	most	of	the	discussion	have	emphasis	the	asymmetry	between	developed	and	developing	regions	in	terms	of	IPRs	ownership	and	its	consequences	in	the	context	of	 IPRs	getting	stricter.	Some	economists	expected	that	short	term	welfare	costs	 for	 developing	 countries	 could	 be	 overcome	 by	 medium	 to	 long	 term	 dynamic	gains	 (Maskus,	 2000).	 	 But	 the	 traditional	 view	 that	 IPRs	 encourage	 innovation	 from	which	all	the	regions	of	the	world	benefit	was	met	by	some	prominent	critics,	including	Helpman	 (1993),	who	 noted	 that	 IPRs	 “only	 strengthen	 the	monopoly	 power	 of	 large	companies	that	are	based	in	industrial	countries,	to	the	detriment	of	the	less	developed	countries”	 (Helpman,	 1993,	 p.	 1248).	 	More	 recently,	 Rodrik	 (2018)	 writes	 that	 “one	needs	 to	 assume	 an	 implausibly	 high	 elasticity	 of	 global	 innovation	 to	 developing	countries’	patents	to	compensate	for	what	is	in	effect	a	pure	transfer	of	rents	from	poor	to	rich	countries	“	(Rodrik,	2018,	p.	5)		Stricter	IPRs	may	also	limit	developing	countries’	policy	 options,	 shrinking	 of	 their	 ‘development	 space’	 as	 they	 reduce	 their	 ability	 to	design	and	implement	industrial	policies	(Wade,	2003,	pp.	624–627)		The	implementation	of	the	TRIPS	agreement	resulted	in	an	important	social	and	political	controversy	 along	 these	 lines.	 Stiglitz	 (2008)	 recalls	 that,	 in	 the	mid-1990s,	 both	 the	President’s	Council	of	Economic	Advisors	and	the	US	Office	of	Science	and	Technology	Policy	 opposed	 the	 TRIPS,	 while	 the	 special	 interests	 from	 the	 pharmaceutical	 and	entertainment	 industries	 strongly	 and	 successfully	 lobbied	 in	 favor	 (Stiglitz,	 2008,	 p.	1694).	This	supports	the	view	that	stricter	IPRs	allow	certain	private	actors	to	increase	their	influence	and	enhance	their	advantages,	building	up	“new	enclosures”	(May,	2000)	at	the	expense	of	the	general	social	good.			Empirical	 studies	 do	 not	 support	 the	 general	 idea	 that	 more	 stringent	 IPRs	 play	 a	positive	 role	 in	developing	 countries.	 Studies	 on	US	 and	 Japanese	multinationals	 have	shown	that	these	firms	have	reacted	to	changes in IPR regimes abroad by significantly 
increasing technology transfer between parent and affiliates (Branstetter et al., 2006; 
Wakasugi and Ito, 2009). However,	 using	 royalty	 payments	 and	 R&D	 expenditure	 to	measure	 technological	 transfer	 could	 be	 misleading	 since	 stricter	 IPRs	 call	 for	 more	royalty	 payments	 and	 R&D	 expenses	 independent	 	 of	 changes	 in	 effective	 technology	transfers.	Beside	these	two	problematic	studies,	there	is	no	other	evidence	of	a	positive	effect	 of	 stricter	 IPRs	 on	 innovation	 or	 productivity	 in	 developing	 countries.	 In	 their	research	 which	 cover	 94	 countries	 from	 1965	 to	 2005,	 Sweet	 et	 al.	 (2015)	 use	 an	indicator	 of	 export	 sophistication	 and	 show	 that,	 for	 developing	 countries,	 IPRs	strengthening	 “has	 at	 best	 a	 non-significant	 effect	 on	 economic	 complexity	 and	most	often	has	a	negative	effect.”		Another	 argument	 for	 strict	 IPRs	 in	 developing	 countries	 has	 been	 their	 role	 in	attracting	inward	FDI,	thus	helping	to	bridge	the	“idea	gap”	with	developed	economies	(Maskus,	1998,	Markusen,	1995;	Romer,	1993;	Teece,	1977).	There	are	two	objections	to	this	argument.	First,	FDI	has	often	not	helped	developing	countries	to	bridge	the	ideas	gap,	since	these	countries	often	lack	the	institutions	and	market	structures	neededed	to	
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capture	 such	 gains	 (Durand,	 2005).	 There	 is	 not	much	 to	 expect	 in	 terms	 of	 positive	productivity	spillovers	from	FDI	for	developing	countries.		In	their	meta-analysis,	Iršová	and	 Havránek	 (2013)	 show	 that	 horizontal	 spillovers	 from	 FDI	 are	 on	 average	 zero	(Iršová	and	Havránek,	2013);	vertical	spillover	to	suppliers	are	economically	significant	and	 spillover	 to	 buyers	 are	 statistically	 significant	 but	 these	 positive	 spillovers	 are	generated	 by	 investors	 who	 have	 only	 a	 slight	 technological	 edge	 over	 local	 firms	(Havranek	and	Irsova,	2011)	which	is	generally	not	the	case	for	FDI	from	developed	to	developing	 countries.	 They	 find	 that	 the	 protection	 of	 intellectual	 property	 rights	 is	insignificant	for	the	magnitude	of	these	vertical	spillovers	(p.	242).			The	 second	objection	 is	 even	more	 straightforward.	There	 is	no	empirical	 support	 for	the	 view	 that	 stricter	 IPRs	 increase	 FDI	 inflows	 (Nunnenkamp	 and	 Spatz,	 2004).	 This	finding	echoes	 research	on	US	 firms	partnering	with	 firms	 in	other	countries	 showing	that	the	degree	of	hierarchical	control	is	inversely	related	to	the	strength	of	intellectual	property	 protection	 (Oxley,	 1999,	 p.	 288).	 Indeed,	 weak	 protection	 of	 intellectual	property	 in	the	foreign	country	will	 tend	to	raise	the	cost	of	relying	on	contract-based	alliances	relative	to	equity	joint	ventures,	thereby	encouraging	the	use	of	joint	ventures	–	a	form	of	FDI	-	for	a	wider	range	of	transactions.	There	is	no	evidence	of	IPRs	favoring	economic	 upgrading	 in	 terms	 of	 export	 sophistication	 or	 positive	 spillover	 from	increasing	FDI.		In	sum,	there	is	no	convincing	evidence	of	a	positive	effects	of	tighter	property	rights	on	innovation,	productivity	growth	or	FDI	inflows	in	developing	countries.	Nonetheless,	the	literature	shows	that	stronger	IPRs	are	associated	with	trade	increases	 	(Awokuse	and	Yin,	2010;	Falvey	et	al.,	2009;	Maskus	and	Konan,	1994;	Maskus	and	Penubarti,	1995;	Rafiquzzaman,	2002;	Smith,	1999;	Weng	et	al.,	2009).	As	we	will	see	now,	this	is	a	key	finding	 that	 provides	 support	 for	 the	 hypothesis	 that	 GVC	 trade	 and	 stricter	 IPRs	 are	mutually	reinforcing.		
3.3. The	complementarity	between	GVC	trade	and	IPRs	The	late	20th	century	internationalization	of	IPRs	and	the	expansion	of	GVC	trade	have	each	 been	 driven	 by	 a	 separate	 set	 of	 factors,	 but	 there	 is	 a	 link	 and	we	 see	 it	 in	 the	growing	 role	 of	 intangible	 assets	 in	 international	 trade.	 	 GVC	 trade	 is	 qualitatively	different	from	the	traditional	exchange	of	 final	goods	or	primary	products.	 	 It	requires	intense	information	flows	to	coordinate	the	labor	process	in	parts	across	countries	(see	section	 2.2).	 Moreover,	 the	 density	 of	 these	 information	 flows	 entails	 a	 risk	 of	appropriation	by	would-be	competitors,	even	more	than	in	traditional	trade	of	finished	products,	 where	 a	 costly	 process	 of	 reverse	 engineering	 is	 required	 prior	 to	 any	imitation	(Mansfield	et	al.,	1981).	In	GVCs,	lead	firms	thus	have	to	weigh	the	advantages	of	disaggregating	 the	production	process	and	the	cost	reduction	 this	can	bring	against	the	risk	of	losing	control	over	some	of	their	proprietary	intangible	assets.			
		 21	
Management	studies	and	transaction	costs	economists	have	stressed	the	importance	of	the	IP	institutional	context	for	business	decisions	when	there	are	international	alliances,	investment	 and	 sourcing	due	 to	 the	 risk	 of	 so	 called	 “appropriability	 hazards”	 (Oxley,	1997;	Teece,	1986).	This	risk	seems	to	have	expanded	since	the	1990s,	although	there	are	 some	 early	 testimonies	 from	 chemical	 and	 information	 industries	 reporting	 a	reluctance	to	transfer	advanced	technology	in	countries	with	weak	intellectual	property	regimes	(Mansfield,	1994,	pp.	26–29).		From	the	perspective	of	 transaction	cost	economics,	 considering	 the	case	of	a	 relation	with	a	foreign	supplier	or	buyer,	the	risk	of	IP	leakage	due	to	a	weak	IP	environment	will	tend	 to	 raise	 the	 cost	 of	 relying	 on	 contract-based	 alliances	 relative	 to	 equity	 joint	venture	 (Oxley,	 1999,	 pp.	 287–288;	Williamson,	 2008,	 p.	 12).	 From	 the	perspective	of	management	 research,	 careful	 management	 of	 the	 flow	 of	 technology	 along	 GVCs	 is	imperative	and	necessitates	strict	control	over	information	flows	in	countries	with	weak	IPRs	 (Prasad	 &	 Sounderpandian,	 2003,	 p.	 246).	 Adequate	 governance	 arrangements,	secrecy	or	restraint	to	outsource	offshore	were	thus	considered	as	the	main	way	to	deal		with	the	risk	of	IP	leaks	in	GVCs:		
Companies	 can	 mitigate	 intellectual	 property	 risk	 by	 bringing,	 or	 keeping,	 some	production	in-house,	or	at	least	under	direct	company	control.	That	is	a	major	reason	why	Motorola	 owns	 some	 of	 the	 testing	 equipment	 at	 supplier	 locations.	Managers	also	can	decrease	risk	by	limiting	the	flow	of	new	intellectual	property	into	countries	with	 weak	 legal	 protections.	 Companies	 like	 Cisco,	 which	 outsources	 all	manufacturing,	 also	 lower	 risk	by	 creating	business	processes	 that	 cannot	be	 easily	replicated	 by	 a	 single	 manufacturer.	 Electronics	 manufacturer	 Sharp	 Corp.	 even	repairs	equipment	itself,	thus	preventing	any	possibility,	accidental	or	otherwise,	that	its	 vendors	 will	 share	 proprietary	 information	 with	 Sharp's	 competitors.	 The	company	goes	 so	 far	 as	 to	 reprogram	various	 computer-aided	machines	used	by	 its	vendors	without	sharing	the	information.	(Chopra	&	Sodhi,	2004,	p.	57)	In	 the	 2010s,	 a	 new	 field	 of	 business	 research	 and	 consulting	 emerged	 around	 the	management	of	 IP	 in	global	value	chains.	 Its	purpose	 is	 to	 circumvent	 the	difficulty	of	using	 formal	 IP	 protection	 channels	 and	 to	 find	 other	 ways	 to	 enforce	 IPRs	 without	limiting	the	scope	of		GVC	activity.	A	first	issue	is	supplier	selection	to	minimize	the	risk	of	IP	leaks	(Wu,	Li,	Chu,	&	Sculli,	2013).		There	is	also	an	attempt	to	move	beyond	legal	procedure	 and	 use	 the	 reporting	 procedures	 created	 for	 the	 implementation	 of	Corporate	 Social	 Responsibility	 to	 enforce	 stricter	 IPRs	 standards	 along	 the	 chains	(Gillai,	 Rammohan,	 &	 Lee,	 2014).	 The	 Center	 for	 Responsible	 Enterprise	 And	 Trade	(CREATe.org)	 was	 founded	 in	 2011	 with	 the	 support	 of	 start-up	 grants	 from	 the	Microsoft	 Corporation	 with	 this	 objective	 of	 fostering	 “a	 culture	 of	 IP	 protection	 and	compliance”	throughout	the	global	supply	chain.	This	agenda	is	becoming	mainstream,	as	it	was	endorsed	by	the	World	Intellectual	Property	Organization	in	its	annual	report	dedicated	to	Intangible	Capital	in	Global	Value	chains	(WIPO,	2017).		These	business	developments	illuminate	the	relation	between	GVC	trade	and	IPRs.	Lead	firms	engaged	in	GVC	trade	are	interested	in	stricter	IPRs	in	trade	agreements	to	contain	
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the	 risk	 of	 IP	 appropriation	 resulting	 from	 the	 international	 fragmentation	 of	production.	 At	 the	 same	 time,	 the	 strengthening	 of	 IPR	 provisions	 in	 international	treaties	 can	contribute	 to	a	deepening	of	 	GVC	 trade	since	 these	provisions	encourage	innovative	firms	to	engage	in	GVC	transactions	without	fear	of	losing	control	over	their	own	 innovations.	With	 data	 on	 119	 countries	 over	 the	 period	 1976–2010,	 	 one	 study	finds	that	the	impact	of	strengthening	IP	protection	is	significantly	stronger	for	imports	of	 more	 technology-intensive	 products,	 which	 suggests	 that	 by	 conforming	 to	 the	minimum	 standards	 of	 intellectual	 property	 protection	 set	 out	 by	 the	 World	 Trade	Organisation,	 the	 middle-income	 countries	 have	 benefited	 most	 in	 importing	technologically	 advanced	 products	 (Chen,	 2017).	 This	 has	 pushed	 the	 case	 for	 IPRs	beyond	the	product	and	piracy	argument	that	is	often	thought	to	drive	the	IPR	debate	in	trade	 negotiations	 and	 towards	 the	 idea	 that	 the	 introduction	 of	 global	 IP	 standards	favor	 transfer	 of	 technology	 by	 multinational	 corporations	 to	 developing	 countries	(Hanel,	2006,	pp.	915,	924).		The	 attempts	 of	 innovative	 firms	 to	 protect	 their	 IP	when	 participating	 in	 GVCs	 puts	them	at	 odds	with	 the	 interest	 of	 actors	 from	developing	 countries.	 	 Indeed,	 from	 the	point	 of	 view	 of	 developing	 countries’	 businesses	 and	 governments,	 the	 potentially	positive	consequences	of	dense	GVC	linkages	have	to	do	not	just	with	market	access	but	also	 with	 knowledge	 transfer.	 	 But	 it	 is	 precisely	 the	 fear	 of	 losing	 control	 of	 such	transfer	that	makes	lead	innovating	firms	to	be	reluctant	to	engage	strategic	intangible	assets	in	GVC	relations.			The	net	effect	of	the	mutual	reinforcement	of	GVC	trade	and	stricter	IPRs	for	developing	countries	 is	 ambiguous.	 On	 the	 one	 hand,	 as	 IP	 protection	 contributes	 to	 a	 denser	circulation	of	intangibles	within	GVCs,	developing	countries’	opportunities	for	economic	upgrading	 via	 productivity	 spillovers	 increase	 with	 collaboration	 with	 better-performing	 firms	 increases	 (Humphrey	 and	 Schmitz,	 2002;	 Kummritz	 et	 al.,	 2017;	Milberg	 and	 Winkler,	 2011).	 On	 the	 other	 hand,	 this	 comes	 at	 a	 price.	 Wider	 and	stronger	 intellectual	 monopoly	 rights	 put	 some	 limits	 on	 the	 scope	 of	 knowledge	appropriation	 by	 developing	 country	 firms,	 erect	 entry	 barriers	 to	 some	 market	segments,	and	fuel	rising	IP	payments.	Although	there	has	been	no	empirical	exploration	of	 the	 net	 impact	 of	 these	 two	 effects,	 the	 broader	 literature	 (discussed	 above)	concerning	stricter	IPRs	in	developing	countries,	suggests	that	this	second	and	negative	effect	is	the	most	powerful.		
4. Monopolization	 dynamics	 arising	 from	 network	
complementarities	and	scalability	of	intangibles		Stricter	international	IP	norms	are	a	source	of	intellectual	monopoly	that	accompanied	the	 expansion	 of	 GVCs.	 These	 legal	 protections	 reinforce	 the	 basic	 economic	 logic	 of	
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intellectual	 monopoly	 in	 GVCs,	 driven	 largely	 by	 the	 centralization	 of	 network	externalities.	 Three	 interrelated	 mechanisms	 contribute	 to	 the	 process:	 the	appropriation	 of	 the	 gains	 arising	 from	 complementarities,	 the	 collection	 of	 data	generated	by	 the	 activities	 along	 the	 chains	 and	 the	uneven	distribution	of	 returns	 to	scale.		We	briefly	discuss	each	of	these.			
4.1. Gate-keeping	and	natural	monopoly	forces	arising	from	chain	integration	Within	 GVCs,	 the	 value	 of	 each	 component	 circulating	 in	 the	 chain	 is	 enhanced	 by	 its	combination	 with	 other	 components:	 conception	 and	 development,	 production,	assembly,	 logistics,	marketing,	 branding,	 sales	 and	 service.	 It	 is	 the	network	nature	of	the	 GVC	 that	 results	 in	 value	 being	 realized.	 	 As	 discussed	 above	 (section	 2.2),	 this	network	 complementarity	 requires	 enormous	 oversight	 to	 guarantee	 “adherence	 to	specific	 technical	 compatibility	 standards”	 (Economides,	1996,	p.	677)	 that	 enable	 the	compatibility	 of	 operations	 along	 the	 chains.	 Such	 oversight	 comes	 from	 lead	 firms	taking	 the	 responsibility	 for	 the	 coordination	 of	 the	 network	 and	 providing	 the	sophisticated	 informational	 infrastructure	 needed	 to	 guarantee	 the	 appropriate	combination	of	partial-products	into	full	commodities	and	to	accommodate	just-in-time	adjustments	 to	 evolving	market	 and	other	 conditions.	 	 This	 is	 the	 very	process	 of	 the	GVC,	and		it	entails	specific	market	structures	in	different	parts	of	the	chain.		
Chain	integration	deepening	in	historical	perspective	With	a	changing	political	environment	and	new	technological	developments,	integration	has	deepened	dramatically	since	the	1980s	(for	a	timeline	of	supply	chain	management	strategies,	tools,	and	techniques	see	Stevens	&	Johnson,	2016,	pp.	22–24)).	In	the	early	2000s,	 reverse	 information	 sharing	 from	 retailers	 to	 manufacturers	 became	 more	prominent	 as	 a	 result	 of	 a	 confluence	 of	 three	 technologies:	 enterprise	 resource	planning	 (ERP)	 systems,	 customer	 relationship	 management	 (CRM)	 systems,	 and	business-to-business	 (B2B)	 exchanges	 (Jain	 and	 Moinzadeh,	 2005).	 In	 the	 2000s,	 the	implementation	of	Radio	frequency	identification	(RFID)	technology	with	the	systematic	tag	of	pallets	has	improved	the	product	flow	between	suppliers	and	retailers,	improving	inventory	 management	 efficiency	 (Shin	 &	 Eksioglu,	 2014).	 However,	 although	 this	deeper	integration	relied	heavily	on	suppliers	investments,	retailers	appropriated	most	of	the	substantial	efficiency	gains	(Baud	&	Durand,	2012,	sec.	5).			Initially,	 information	 sharing	 mainly	 concerned	 final	 product	 demand	 and	 inventory	control.	 But	 it	 expanded	 to	 other	 items	 such	 as	 quality	 controls	 through	 dedicated	software,	for	example	in	the	automotive	industry	(Batson	and	McGough,	2007;	Liker	and	Choi,	 2004).	 Zara’s	 Inditex	 illustrates	 another	 dynamic,	 where	 apparel	 point	 of	 sale	(POS)	data	and	customers	comments	on	social	media	are	used	to	drive	reactive	design	and	near-shoring	manufacturing,	allowing	new	design	to	arrive	in	store	within	15	days	
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of	concept	(Aronow,	Ennis,	&	Romano,	2017;	Christopher,	2000;	Tang	&	Tomlin,	2008;	Tokatli,	2008).	
		Apple	is	an	even	more	radical	case	due	to	the	complexity	of	its	products	and	industrial	processes.	 The	 firm	 abandoned	 its	 factories	 of	 Fountain	 in	 Colorado	 Springs	 and	 Elk	Grove	 in	 Sacramento	 in	 1996	 and	 2004	 (Barlett	 &	 Steele,	 2011)	 and	 generated	 a	veritable	 industrial	 renaissance	 based	 on	 value	 chains	 management	 capabilities,	becoming	 the	most	 renown	 factory-less	goods	producer	 in	 the	world	(Bernard	&	Fort,	2015).	Apple	makes	none	of	its	products	itself.		All	manufacturing	is	performed	by	other	firms	in	China	and	elsewhere.		Nonetheless,	the	firm	built	“a	closed	ecosystem	where	it	exerts	control	over	nearly	every	piece	of	the	supply	chain,	 from	design	to	retail	store.”	(Satariano	 &	 Burrows,	 2011).	 Apple	 innovation	 capabilities	 goes	 beyond	 design,	development,	 marketing	 and	 the	 creation	 of	 the	 software	 to	 include	 the	 technical	features	of	the	parts	of	its	products	but	also	the	improvement	of	the	means	of	producing	these	 products.	 While	 manufacturing	 subcontractors	 do	 the	 actual	 production,	manufacturing	equipment	design	and	capability	are	a	distinctive	competitive	advantage	of	the	company.	Suppliers	who	provide	some	intellectual	property	to	the	process	face	a	risk	 that	 Apple	 can	 abruptly	 sever	 its	 purchases	 in	 order	 to	 take	 control	 of	 what	 it	considers	 to	 be	 strategic	 technologies,	 as	 the	 GPU	 chip	 designer	 Imagination	Technologies	 learned	 at	 its	 expense	when	 it	was	 abruptly	 sidelined	 by	Apple	 in	 2017	(Barrett,	 2017;	Bradshaw,	2017).	According	 to	 industry	 specialists,	what	 is	 at	 stake	 is	the	ability	of	the	Apple	to	optimize	the	design	of	the	processors	for	the	specific	function	of	its	products	and	to	allow	customization	in	order	to	differentiate	its	devices	and	keep	competitors	 at	 bay.	 To	 be	 effective,	 these	 manufacturing	 capabilities	 without	 direct	ownership	 of	 manufacturing	 operations	 rely	 on	 a	 distinctive	 ability	 to	 integrate	 the	operations,	i.e.	an	organizational	and	information	system	that	coordinates	and	monitors	the	dispersed	productive	operations	processes	in	a	coherent	labor	process.	This	is	a	key	asset	of	Apple	and	an	obligatory	passage	for	its	suppliers	to	get	access	to	their	enormous	consumer	end	market.		The	trend	toward	greater	integration	within	GVCs	continued	with	the	early	deployment	of	 the	 internet	of	 things	(IoT)	(Atzori	et	al.,	2010;	Wortmann	and	Flüchter,	2015).	The	
industrial	internet	consortium,	which	was	formed	in	2014	with	the	support	of	GE,	AT&T,	Cisco,	 Intel	 and	 IBM,	 aims	 at	 developing	 standards	 to	 foster	 the	 implementation	 of	internet-connected	 technologies	 to	 the	 many	 objects	 and	 parts	 circulating	 across	industries.	 	 	 Industry	 4.O.	 is	 a	 competing	 framework	 initiated	 by	 the	 German	government	 to	 safeguard	 a	 sustainable	 competitive	 advantage	 for	 the	 German	manufacturing	 base	 through	 the	 deployment	 of	 Cyber	 Physical	 Systems	 (hardware	systems	 with	 embedded	 software)	 (Hermann,	 Pentek,	 &	 Otto,	 2016).	 Such	 complex	information	 systems	 are	 an	 integral	 part	 of	 the	 emerging	 architecture	 of	 GVCs	 as	networks	 combining	 Internet	 of	 Things	 (IoT)	 sensors,	 cloud	 computing	 and	 advanced	analytics.	 In	 its	 2017	 Global	 supply	 chain	 top	 25	 report,	 the	 consulting	 firm	 Gartner	describes	this	emerging	trend,	stating	that	“The	digital	pieces	of	the	supply	chain	puzzle	
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are	 coming	 together	 in	 a	way	 that	will	 enable	more	holistic,	 real-time	management	of	the	entire	ecosystem”	(Aronow	et	al.,	2017).		
The	economic	advantage	of	building	and	controlling	the	chain	infrastructure		Over	 the	past	decades,	 the	progressive	deepening	of	GVCs	 toward	“more	holistic,	 real-time	 management	 of	 the	 entire	 ecosystem”	 result	 from	 the	 building	 of	 informational	backbones	and	management	know-how	that	sustain	the	circulation	of	 information	and	physical	 flows.	 These	 are	 intangible	 assets.	 By	 providing	 the	 network	 with	 an	organizational	 integration	 framework,	 leading	 integrators	 occupy	 a	 singular	 position	vis-à-vis	other	participants.	Because	the	firms	that	coordinate	the	chain	allow	the	other	participants	 to	 participate	 in	 the	 network	 and,	 consequently,	 to	 enhance	 the	 value	and/or	volume	of	their	activities,	they	are	in	position	to	reap	a	disproportionately	large	share	 of	 the	 enhancement	 of	 value	 created	 through	 network	 cooperation.	 This	 is	 the	case	because	natural	monopoly	features	protect	the	integrator	market	power.		A	 natural	 monopoly	 is	 a	 market	 structure	 where	 some	 combination	 of	 economies	 of	scale	 	 (high	 start-up	 costs	 and	 low	marginal	 costs),	 sunk	 costs	 (irreversibility	 of	 the	initial	 investment)	 and	 the	 presence	 of	 positive	 network	 externalities	(complementarities	between	uses)	result	in	a	sub-additive	cost	function,	where	only	one	firm	 find	 it	 profitable	 to	 produce	 (for	 a	 review	 see	 (Mosca,	 2008)).	 All	 these	 forces	contributing	 to	 the	 formation	of	natural	monopoly	are	present	 in	 the	process	of	value	chain	integration:	First,	there	are	significant	fixed	costs	associated	to	the	building	of	the	informational	and	organizational	infrastructure	of	a	value	chain;	Second,	these	costs	are	to	 a	 large	 extent	 sunk,	 and	 thus	 such	 intangible	 assets	 are	 dedicated	 to	 a	 specific	purpose	 and	 cannot	 be	 redeployed	 without	 tremendous	 loss;	 and	 third,		complementarities	between	participants	make	it	difficult	to	leave	a	given	value	chain	or	to	build	 a	 competing	one.	 In	 such	 a	 configuration,	market	 forces	 alone	 are	unlikely	 to	reduce	 market	 power	 (Motta	 2004:	 71).	 In	 contrast	 with	 the	 traditional	 natural	monopoly	literature,	the	emphasis	of	the	GVC	perspective	is	not	horizontal	competition	between	 producers	 but	 vertical	 competition	 between	 firms	 contributing	 to	 the	production	of	 the	same	family	of	goods.	What	 is	at	stake	 in	 the	competition	process	 is	thus	 the	control	of	 the	gains	arising	 from	the	cooperation	along	the	chain.	 	Organizing	fragmentation	is	instrumental	to	the	centralization	of	profits.			It	is	important	to	note	that	in	GVCs	it	is	generally	not	the	case	that	one	single	firm	takes	responsibility	 for	 the	 integration	of	 the	whole	chain	 (Gibbon, 2008, pp. 37–38).	Most	of	the	time,	several	lead	firms	are	involved	in		oversight	of	the	chain,	distributing	unevenly	some	degree	of	control	over	the	whole	integration.	This	is	the	case	for	example	when	the	leading	subcontractor	takes	 full	responsibility	 for	the	coordination	of	some	part	of	 the	upstream	 segments,	 for	 example	 first-tier	 suppliers	 like	 Bosch	 and	 Valeo	 in	 the	automotive	 industry	 (Humphrey,	 2003;	 Caputo	 &	 Zirpoli,	 2002)	 or	 giant	 contract	
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manufacturers	or	traders	such	as	Foxconn	in	electronics,	Yue	Yuen	in	footwear	and	Li	&	Fung	in	the	textile	and	apparel	industry	(Gereffi,	2014,	p.	16).			Another	category	 is	horizontal	overlapping	between	chains.	One	can	think	about	 firms	such	as	SAP,	Oracle	or	Dassault	System	that	provide	business	software	for	a	wide	range	of	firms	in	different	industries	which	 	allows	them	to	integrate	their	operations	within	and	 beyond	 the	 boundaries	 of	 their	 companies.	 Such	 software	 companies,	 just	 like	consulting	 firms,	 are	 suppliers	 to	 lead	 firms,	 but	 their	 position	 is	 specific	 as	 they	prescribe	organizational	design	and	thus	have	some	oversight	of	the	integration	process.			In	 sum,	 chain	 integration	 deepening	 in	 GVCs	 over	 the	 past	 decades	 has	 involved	 a	growing	role	for	information	system	in	the	coordination	of	unbundled	activities.	In	this	process,	 the	combination	of	 sunk	and	 irreversible	costs	and	network	effects	generates	natural	monopoly	forces	that	allow	lead	(integrator)	firms	to	capture	a	disproportionate	share	of	the	mutual	gains	of	cooperation.	Natural	monopoly	power	may	in	some	cases	be	dispersed	across	a	few	firms	depending	on	the	degree	of	contribution	to	the	oversight	of	the	 integration	 process	 and	 to	 the	 share	 of	 the	 positive	 externalities	 arising	 from	network	complementarities	that	firms	involved	in	GVCs	can	appropriate.			
4.2. Innovative	advantage	of	centralizing	the	data	The	 accumulation	 of	 data	 is	 at	 the	 heart	 of	 the	 business	 model	 of	 giant	 internet	companies	 such	 as	 Google,	 Facebook,	 Amazon,	 Tencent	 and	 Alibaba.	 User-generated	data	 allows	 these	 firms	 to	 enhance	 user	 experience	 and	 to	 design	 focused	advertisements	 that	 they	 sell	 to	 other	 businesses.	 Alphabet	 (the	 parent	 company	 	 of	Google),	for	example,	generates	87%	of	its	income	from	advertising	(US	SEC,	2017)	and	controls	42%	of	digital	ad	market	 in	the	US	and	33	%		 in	the	world	(eMarketer,	2017;	Molla,	2017).	The	 “acceleration	 to	 scale”	 (Schmidt	&	Cohen,	2014,	p.	10)	 that	 is	at	 the	root	of	the	explosive	growth	of	the	digital	platforms	and	has	put	them	among	the	world’s	biggest	 corporations	 in	 terms	 of	 market	 capitalization3	 derives	 from	 their	 ability	 to	generate,	control	and	manage	data.		The	 importance	 of	 data	 is	 relevant	 beyond	 internet	 companies	 to	 the	wider	 economy	and,	 in	particular	 to	GVC	organization.	The	 (partial)	 centralization	of	 the	gains	arising	from	 network	 complementarities	 is	 reinforced	 by	 another	 centripetal	 process:	 the	centralization	of	information	that	results	from	the	very	process	of	integration	deepening.	GVC	 integration	 generates	 huge	 amount	 of	 data	 through	 the	 functional	 linking	 of	marketing,	logistics,	operations	and	sourcing	applications,	and	these	data	are	powerfully	leveraged	by	companies	operating	at	 large	scale	(Sanders,	2016).	This	accumulation	of	data	 from	 suppliers	 and	 customers	 becomes	 proprietary	 data	 and	 represents	 “a	 core	asset	that	can	create	significant	competitive	advantage”	(OECD,	2013).																																																									3	As	of	February	6	2018,	7	of	the	ten	biggest	firms		by	market	capitalization	where	tech	companies.	These	were,	by	descending	order	:	Apple,	Alphabet,	Microsoft,	Amazon,	Facebook,	Tencent	and	Alibaba.			
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	Lead	 firms	 that	 take	 responsibility	 for	 the	 coordination	 of	 GVCs	 rely	 on	 dedicated	information	 systems,	 whose	 reach	 connects	 them	 directly	 to	 supplier	 operations	 and	customer	 behavior.	 This	 is	 the	 case	 for	 Wal-Mart,	 for	 example,	 that	 connects	 the	activities	of	 its	245	million	customers	at	 the	 rhythm	of	one	million	 transactions	every	hour	 with	 its	 logistics	 and	 suppliers	 data.	Wal-Mart	 relies	 on	 an	 SAP	 software	 called	“HANA	 business	 intelligence	 platform”	to	 assemble	 data	 from	 different	 parts	 of	 the	enterprise	 and	 visualize	 it	 in	 real	 time.	 According	 to	Wal-Mart	 CIO	 Karenann	 Terrell,	“HANA	is	floating	on	our	ERP	system.	Innovation	doesn’t	rest	in	the	back	office.”(Wilson,	2015).	 In	Data	 café,	 the	 firm’s	 analytics-hub	 located	 at	 its	 headquarter	 in	Bentonville,	Arkansas,	2.5	petabytes	of	data	fueled	by	200	internal	and	external	streams	(including	meteorological,	 social	 media,	 economic	 telecom	 and	 local	 event	 data)	 are	 processed	every	 hour.	 Teams	 from	 every	 department	 are	 invited	 to	 bring	 their	 problems	 to	 the	analytics	experts,	helping	them	to	solve	complex	business	questions	through	statistical	queries	completed	in	a	few	seconds	(Marr,	2017).			At	 the	 root	 of	 this	 informational	 advantage	 is	 the	 position	 of	 Wal-Mart	 vis-à-vis	 its	supply	base.	Through	its	software	Retail	Link,	the	firm	is	connected	to	more	than	17,500	suppliers.	These	suppliers	can	improve	their	operations	as	they	have	access	to	point-of	-sale	 data	 concerning	 their	 own	 products.	 	 In	 return,	Wal-Mart	 gets	 a	 panoptic	 vision	from	within	of	the	operations	of	all	of	them,	concerning	their	production	planning,	the	design	and	the	conditioning	of	their	products	(Sanders,	2016,	pp.	32–34;	Wang,	2006,	p.	59).			The	advantage	in	terms	of	data	gathering	is	not	limited	to	the	systematic	centralization	resulting	from	the	implementation	of	the	trans-organization	information	system.	Taking	advantage	of	their	bargaining	power,	lead	firms	try	to	expand	their	intimate	knowledge	of	 the	 value	 chain,	 asking	 their	 suppliers	 details	 of	 their	 business	 operations	 in	 the	course	of	the	contractual	negotiations,	as	it	has	been	reported	for	Apple:	
Life	as	an	Apple	supplier	is	lucrative	because	of	the	high	volumes	but	painful	because	of	 the	 strings	 attached.	 When	 Apple	 asks	 for	 a	 price	 quote	 for	 parts	 such	 as	touchscreens,	 it	 demands	 a	detailed	 accounting	of	 how	 the	manufacturer	 arrived	 at	the	quote,	including	its	estimates	for	material	and	labor	costs,	and	its	own	projected	profit.	(Satariano	&	Burrows,	2011).	Another	 illustration	 of	 the	 hunt	 for	 data	 is	 the	 fact	 that	 established	 information	technology	enterprises	such	as	IBM,	SAP,	Microsoft,	Intel	and	Cisco,	numerous	startups	but	also	manufacturers	such	as	Rolls-Royce,	GE	and	Siemens	have	been	investing	heavily	in	“predictive	maintenance”,	i.e.	real-time	monitoring	of	equipment	in	order	to	optimize	scheduling	of	maintenance	work	and	prevent	unexpected	equipment	failures.		For	these	firms,	 this	 is	 “one	 of	 the	 myriad	 ways	 they	 capture	 data	 across	 the	 value-chain	 to	improve	efficiencies	and	automate	work.”		(McGee,	2017).	Bernd	Leukert,	SAP	executive	board	member	and	steering	committee	chairman	of	the	Plattform	Industrie	4.0	initiative,	
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describes	 the	 tensions	 resulting	 from	 the	 intertwining	of	 information	 systems	 implied	by	predictive	maintenance:	
Companies	need	to	be	sure	that	connecting	their	machines	with	the	machine	vendor	or	a	service	provider	doesn’t	result	in	leaks	of	important	customer	or	production	data.	A	service	provider	does	not	need	to	know	which	CAD	[Computer	Aided	Design]	files	you	 are	 running	 on	 your	milling	machine,	 but	 on	 the	 other	 hand,	 he	 needs	 enough	information	about	 the	machines,	devices,	 and	assets	 to	be	able	 to	provide	proactive	maintenance,	 thus	 avoiding	 costly	 downtimes	 in	 your	 production	environment.(Leukert,	2017)	Siemens	 CEO	 Joe	 Kaeser	 echoes	 this	 statement	 when	 he	 explains	 the	 strategic	 issues	related	 to	 the	 uses	 of	 data	 resulting	 from	 the	 co-evolution	 of	 machinery	 and	 digital	systems.		It	is	worth	quoting	him	at	some	lenght:	
We	 manufacture	 products	 that	 generate	 power,	 that	 automate	 manufacturing	processes,	 that	 scan	people	 (like	CT	 and	MRI	machines),	 and	 that	move	people	 and	goods	 from	place	A	 to	place	B.	That’s	 a	 lot	of	products,	 and	all	 those	products	have	sensors.	(…),	once	we	get	the	data,	we	have	the	data	analytics	platform	and	the	cloud.	We	have	a	proprietary	cloud,	for	example,	an	on-site	cloud.	Our	customers	care	about	manufacturing	 and	 engineering	 data	 and	 intellectual	 property	 rights	 because	 [this	type	of	data]	is	the	holy	grail	of	innovation	».	(…)	«	Data	 analytics	 gives	 a	 company	 a	 lot	 of	 information	 [it	 can	 use]	 to	 optimize	 and	shorten	the	value	chain.	(…)	You	can	make	products	faster,	more	cost-efficiently,	more	flexibly.	You	can	produce	in	lot	sizes	of	one.	You	can	cut	out	different	links	of	the	value	chain.	And	 the	 links	 that	 get	 cut	out	provide	 the	 least	 value	 in	 the	value	 chain.	And	that’s	 what	 you	 need	 to	 understand.	 “Where	 am	 I	 in	 the	 value	 chain?	 How	 can	 I	remain	a	strong	link	by	providing	more	value	than	anyone	else	in	there?”	You’d	better	know	what	you	can	do	with	your	data	and	cut	someone	else	out	rather	than	get	cut	out	 yourself.	 The	 issue	 isn’t	 just	 that	 your	 suppliers	might	 try	 to	 cut	 you	 out.	 Your	customers	might	 try	 to	cut	you	out	because	 they	say,	 “I’ve	got	 the	data,	so	why	do	 I	need	you?”	That’s	the	paradigm	shift….		(Kaeser	&	Gross,	2016)	Another	 interesting	 illustration	 of	 the	 data	 implications	 of	 the	 move	 toward	 deeper	integration	 concerns	 the	 building	 industry.	 The	 Building	 information	modeling	 (BIM)	process	 allows	 individuals,	 businesses	 and	 government	 agencies	 to	 plan,	 design,	construct,	 operate	 and	 maintain	 housing	 projects,	 public	 facilities	 and	 physical	infrastructure	such	as	utilities,	roads,	bridges,	ports,	tunnels,	etc.	The	rapid	international	adoption	 of	 this	 tool	 for	 its	 powerful	 data-based	modeling,	 visualization,	 analysis	 and	simulation	 capabilities	 represents	 a	 paradigm	 shift	 for	 the	 construction	 industry.	Increasing	 integration	 of	 operations	 favors	 the	 industrialization	 of	 the	whole	 building	production	process	and	allows	for	the	implementation	of	lean	management	technics.	As	a	 result,	 “The	power	 is	 shifted	upstream	 in	 the	design	 stage	 and	 the	 construction	 site	becomes	more	and	more	standardised	with	little	room	for	change.”(Davies	et	al.,	2015,	p.	1143).		Bouygues	construction,	one	lead	firm	of	the	sector	in	France	developed,	with	consulting	 firm	 Accenture	 and	 software	 designer	 Dassault	 Systèmes,	 one	 such	 digital	
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environment	 for	 construction	 project	 management.	 This	 system	 is	 based	 on	 Dassault	Systèmes’	3DEXPERIENCE	platform,	which	is	already	used	in	other	industries	including	automotive	and	aerospace.	According	to	its	initiators,	what	is	at	stake	with	this	project	is	that	 by	 employing	 all	 project	 data	 across	 the	 board,	 this	 solution	 would	 guarantee	greater	 efficiency.	But	 there	 is	 something	more.	As	 explained	Bernard	Charlès,	CEO	of	Dassault	Systèmes,	it	is	changing	the	dynamics	of	value	capture	along	the	chain:	
	“The	3DEXPERIENCE	platform	gives	Bouygues	Construction	a	unique	opportunity	to	be	 the	 pioneer	 in	 the	 construction	 sector	 with	 business	 processes	 and	 a	 holistic	approach	integrating	the	company	and	its	supply	chain	into	a	value	creation	chain.	“Thanks	to	the	parallel	exchange	of	data	between	the	virtual	world	and	the	real	world,	Bouygues	Construction	will	be	able	to	set	new	standards	of	efficiency	and	capture	all	the	business	value	expected	from	its	digital	transformation.”(Bouygues	Construction,	2017)	There	 is	 thus	a	vertical	competitive	struggle	 for	 the	control	of	 	data.	On	 the	one	hand,	letting	data	circulate	is	a	pre-condition	for	allowing	the	integration	and	the	optimization	of	 business	 processes	 along	 GVCs.	 	 On	 the	 other	 hand,	 such	 integration	 gives	disproportionate	data	 access	 to	 those	who	 initiate	 and	organize	 the	 chain	 integration.	The	 asymmetric	 design	 of	 information	 systems	 and	 the	 uneven	 bargaining	 power	 in	contractual	negotiations	allow	dominant	firms	to	learn	from	their	partners’	businesses	processes.	Because	the	control	of	data	is	the	“holy	grail”	that	gives	companies	the	ability	to	 innovate	 and	 cut	 out	 their	 competitors	 upstream	 or	 downstream,	 the	 uneven	distribution	of	 data	 along	GVCs	 entails	 a	dynamic	 and	 cumulative	 advantage	 for	 firms	that	plays	a	lead	role	in	chain	integration.			
4.3. Uneven	intangible	intensity	and	the	uneven	distribution	of	returns	to	scale		We	turn	now	to	a	final	mechanism	related	to	the	distinctive	nature	of	scale	economies	of	tangible	 assets	 compared	 to	 intangible	 assets.	 Intangible	 assets	 such	 as	 standards,	specifications,	R&D	achievements,	as	well	as	software	and	organizational	know-how	are	typically	 scalable	 assets.	 They	 impose	 negligible	 marginal	 costs	 following	 the	 initial	investment	made	 to	 create	 them.	 This	 results	 in	 infinite	 returns	 to	 scale.	 The	 role	 of	intangible	 assets	 looms	 large	 in	 current	 competitive	 dynamics,	 for	 example,	 in	 the	growing	rivalry	between	Walmart	and	Amazon.		According	to	a	report	in	The	New	York	
Times:	
“Retailers	need	 to	 figure	out	how	to	manage	sophisticated	supply	chains	connecting	Southeast	 Asia	 with	 stores	 in	 big	 American	 cities	 so	 that	 they	 rarely	 run	 out	 of	product.	They	need	mobile	apps	and	websites	that	offer	a	seamless	user	experience	so	that	 nothing	 stands	 between	 a	 would-be	 purchaser	 and	 an	 order.	 (…).	 Larger	companies	 that	 are	 good	 at	 supply	 chain	 management	 and	 technology	 can	 spread	those	more-or-less	fixed	costs	around	more	total	sales.”(Irwin,	2017)		
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This	 feature	 is	 in	 striking	 contrast	with	 tangible	 assets:	 even	 if	 tangible	 assets	 exhibit	some	increasing	returns,	these	are	certainly	finite,	and	their	physical	nature	makes	them	subject	at	some	point	 to	diseconomies	of	scale.	Now	consider	 the	 fact	 that	along	GVCs	some	 segment	 are	 intensive	 in	 tangible	 assets	 --	 the	 manufacturing	 of	 clothes,	 the	assembling	 of	 food	 processors,	 a	 semi-conductor	 fabrication	 plant,	 railway	transportation.	 Other	 segments	 are	 intensive	 in	 intangible	 assets	 --	 fashion	 design,	integrated	circuit	or	web	design,	marketing,	software	coding,	supply	chain	management	information	 system.	 As	 the	 output	 of	 the	 GVC	 expands,	 its	 intangible-	 and	 tangible-intensive	 segments	 expand	 at	 different	 rates.	 	Due	 to	 the	 uneven	distribution	 of	 fixed	costs,	 total	costs	grow	more	rapidly	 for	 tangible-intensive	segments	and	average	costs	diminish	much	more	rapidly	for	the	intangible-intensive	segment.		This	is	illustrated	in	Figure	 12.	 The	 difference	 in	 scale	 economies	 between	 tangible	 and	 intangible	 assets	means	 that	 those	 firms	 controlling	 the	 intangible-intensive	 parts	 of	 the	 chain	 will	receive	 a	 disproportionate	 share	 of	 the	 gains	 from	 the	 network	 as	 output	 expands.	Intangible-	 intensive	 segments	 thus	 benefit	 more	 from	 increasing	 GVC	 output	 than	tangible-intensive	firms.			The	 uneven	 distribution	 of	 returns	 to	 scale	 due	 to	 uneven	 distribution	 of	 intangible	intensity	in	the	various	nodes	of	a	chain	is	thus	a	third	phenomenon	contributing	to	the	centralization	of	network	externalities.		
Figure	12:	Total	and	average	cost	dynamics	for	tangible	intensive	and	intangible	intensive	segments	(authors'	
elaboration)	
					Intellectual	monopoly	 in	 global	 value	 chains	 results	 from	 two	distinctive	 but	 partially	overlapping	 and	 cumulative	 processes.	 The	 first	 one,	 examined	 in	 section	 3.3,	 arises	from	 the	 complementarity	 between	 the	 fragmentation	 of	 production	 and	 stricter	intellectual	property	rights.	The	second,	which	we	just	discussed,	results	from	the	role	of	
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intangibles	within	the	GVC	form	of	industrial	organization:	firms	playing	a	leading	role	in	 the	 integration	 benefit	 from	 natural	 monopoly	 forces	 arising	 from	 the	complementarities	 between	 the	 participants	 to	 the	 chain,	 from	 the	 collection	 of	 data	generated	by	the	activities	along	the	chains,	and	from	the	uneven	distribution	of	returns	to	scale	between	tangible	intensive	and	intangible	intensive	nodes.		These	 various	 intellectual	 monopoly	 forces	 are	 not	 exclusive	 from	 one	 another	 and	generate	 rents	 that	 can	be	 combined.	 Table	1	 summarizes	 our	 argument	 by	 clarifying	and	 illustrating	 these	 distinctive	 but	 corresponding	 rents.	 Legal	 monopoly	 rents	 arise	from	 patents,	 copyrights	 and	 trademarks.	 They	 necessitate	 juridical	 enforcement	 that	protects	R&D	and	marketing	expenses	of	their	owners	by	artificially	rationing	the	uses	of	 the	protected	knowledge.	Natural	monopoly	 rents	 result	 from	network	externalities	when	 the	 investment	 supporting	 the	 network	 exhibits	 return	 to	 scale	 and	 sunk	 costs,	which	is	the	case	for	information	system	and	supply	chain	management	know-how	that	allowed	 the	 deepening	 of	 integration	 in	 the	 past	 decades.	We	 call	dynamic	 innovation	
rents	those	benefits	accruing	from	the	ability	to	centralize	the	data.		This	centralization	fosters	 a	 cumulative	 advantage	 in	 terms	 of	 ability	 to	 innovate	 that	 we	 identify	 with	Schumpeter	 “Mark	 II”	 pattern	 of	 innovation	 of	 “creative	 accumulation”	 (Malerba	 &	Orsenigo,	1995).	Finally,	we	label	as	intangibles-differential	rent,	the	rent	accruing	from	uneven	distribution	of	intangible	intensity	and	the	resulting	uneven	cost	dynamics.		The	name	 originates	 from	 differential	 land	 rent	 Ricardo	 identified	 to	 characterized	 the	differential	returns	between	unevenly	fertile	lands	(Ricardo,	1817).			
Table	1:	Intellectual	monopolies	in	GVCs:	A	taxonomy	of	rents	related	to	intangible	assets.	
TYPE DESCRIPTION EXAMPLE 
LEGAL IP RENT  
 PATENTS, 
COPYRIGHTS, 
TRADEMARKS 
Rationing via exclusive rights on product 
production, process uses, cultural and 
scientific items, and marketing 
investment 
Patents on pharmaceuticals, 
software features and coding, 
names protection (Nike, Louis 
Vuitton) 
NATURAL MONOPOLY RENT 
 TOLL ON GVC 
INTEGRATION 
Returns on intangibles underlying the 
integration  
Network complementarities within GVC 
Sunk costs resulting from asset 
specificities  
Apple supply chain 
management  
Valeo, Bosch supply chain 
management of auto parts 
DYNAMIC INNOVATION RENT 
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 SCHUMPETER 
MARK II VIA DATA 
COLLECTION 
Centralization data generated along 
GVCs via asymmetric information 
systems 
 
Data fuel Schumpeter Mark II innovation 
path 
 
Siemens sensors on 
machinery, Goodyear tires 
sensors   
Wal-Mart retailink software  
Amazon shopping histories 
INTANGIBLES-DIFFERENTIAL RENT  
 UNEVEN RETURNS 
TO SCALE  
Uneven returns to scale on intangibles 
vis-à-vis tangibles allow intangible 
intensive segments of the chain to 
capture a larger share of the gains 
Apple and Nike fabless 
manufacturing versus 
assembling factories 
Nespresso versus coffee 
producers 			
5. Intellectual	monopoly,	economic	growth	and	development		Industrial	 upgrading	 within	 GVCs	 has	 become,	 in	 some	 circles,	 synonymous	 with	economic	 development.	 	 China’s	 enormous	 industrialization	 success	 has	 prominently	featured	GVC	participation.	 	And	other	 countries	 --	 from	Mexico	 to	Poland	 to	Vietnam	and	 others	 --	 have	 tried	 to	 utilize	 the	market	 access	 and	 reduced	 entry	 barriers	 from	GVC	participation	as	development	strategies.		As	GVCs	become	more	IP-intensive,	what	will	 be	 the	 impact	 of	 intellectual	 monopoly	 on	 prospects	 for	 economic	 growth	 and	development?	 We	 see	 three	 issues.	 One	 is	 the	 uneven	 geographical	 distribution	 of	intangibles	 that	 may	 limit	 economic	 and	 social	 upgrading	 by	 developing	 countries.	Second	 is	 that	 the	 monopolization	 dynamics	 may	 exacerbate	 trends	 in	 high-income	economies	 concerning	 financialization	 and	 a	 slowdown	 of	 capital	 investment.	 Finally,	the	capture	of	value	via	control	over	intangibles	can	be	linked	to	the	erosion	of	national	tax	bases,	an	issue	that	concerns	developing	and	high-income	economies	alike.			
5.1. Uneven	geographical	distribution	of	intangibles		There	 is	 a	 highly	 skewed	 distribution	 of	 intangible-intensive	 and	 non-intangible-intensive	firms	across	the	world,	with	the	former	heavily	concentrated	in	industrialized	countries.	 Figure	 13	 shows	 the	mean	 and	 the	median	 of	 industry-country	 intangible-asset	intensity	for	advanced	economies	and	the	rest	of	the	world.	This	ratio	of	intangible	to	tangible	assets	increased	significantly	for	both	groups	since	2000;	however,	there	is	a	huge	gap	between	them,	and	this	gap	grew	larger	in	favor	of	advanced	economies.	Note	that	 the	 mean	 is	 well	 above	 the	 median	 in	 both	 cases,	 indicating	 a	 concentration	 of	intangible	 asset	 intensity	 in	 a	 small	 number	 of	 firms.	 At	 the	 lower	 level	 of	 relative	intangible-asset	 intensity	 in	 the	rest	of	 the	world,	 this	deviation	of	mean	 from	median	
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suggests	 that	most	 of	 these	 country’s	 industries	 are	 almost	 completely	 deprived	 from	control	over	intangible	assets.		
	
Figure	13:	Relative	intangible	asset	intensity	in	advanced	and	developing	countries,	(2000-2015)	4	
			The	 skewed	 distribution	 of	 intangible	 assets	 limits	 value	 capture	 opportunities	 by	tangible-intensive	producers	from	the	south	and	let	not	much	room	for	social	upgrading.		An	 example	 is	 the	 coffee	 GVC,	 which	 is	 largely	 buyer	 driven	 and	 dominated	 by	 a	relatively	small	number	of	multinational	companies	headquartered	 in	 the	 large	coffee-consuming	 countries	 (WIPO,	 2017,	 pp.	 12–13).	 Patent	 data	 suggest	 that	 the	 most	innovative	 value	 chain	 stages	 are	 those	 closer	 to	 the	 consumer,	 including	 the	modern	espresso	machines	and	coffee	capsules.	As	a	result,	direct	intellectual	property	barriers	and	 indirect	 barriers	 arising	 from	 branding,	 protecting	 the	 access	 to	 final	 consumers,	combine	 to	 erect	 powerful	 entry	 barriers	 for	 Southern	 producers	 to	 the	 final	market.	Modern	 marketing	 techniques	 allowing	 the	 collection	 of	 consumer	 data	 play	 an	additional	 role	 in	 preventing	 producers	 to	 climb	 the	 value	 chain,	 while	 the	 uneven	distribution	 of	 intangibles	 allow	 lead	 firms	 to	 reap	 a	 disproportionate	 share	 of	 the	benefits	of	output	expansion.																																																										4	 	 Average	 and	 median	industry/country	by	 country	 group	 based	 on	 revenue	 weighted	 average	obervations	(a	particular	firm	in	a	particular	year,	weighted	by	the	revenue	of	that	year	for	that	firm).	All	sectors	except	ISIC	A,	B,	K	and	O	:	agriculture,	mining	and	carrying,	financial	and	insurance	activities	and	public	 administration.	 IMF	 Advanced	 countries	 versus	 the	 rest	 of	 the	 world.	 Top	 1%	 eliminated,	 only	positive	 values	 observations.	 Intangible	 intensity:	 intangible	 /	 tangible	 assets	 (Tangible	 assets	 as	Property,	 Plant,	 and	 Equipment	 (Net	 	Total)	 (PPENT)).	 In	 2000,	 information	 is	 available	 for	 385	industry/country	in	advanced	economies	and	113	in	developing	countries	;	on	2015,	these	occurrence	are	respectively	660	and	368.			
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While,	this	example	is	likely	relevant	in	a	number	of	industries	and	countries,	the	case	of	China	 is	 particular.	 Because	 of	 the	 size	 of	 its	 domestic	 market	 and	 high	 degree	 of	political	 centralization,	 it	 has	 been	 able	 to	 resist	 IP	 protections	 for	 some	 time	 and	 to	capture	some	knowledge	circulating	 in	GVCs	 to	enhance	domestic	development.	 	Most	developing	countries	are	not	in	a	position	to	do	this.		
5.2. Financialization	and	stagnation	tendencies	with	intellectual	monopoly	A	 second	 concern	 that	 arises	 from	 our	 analysis	 of	 intellectual	 monopoly	 in	 GVCs	 is	financialization,	understood	as	the	disconnection	between	profits	and	investment	(for	a	review	see	.	US	firms	in	particular	have	had	high	levels	of	profit	and	cash	flow	in	the	past	15	to	20	years	associated	with	a	disproportionately	large	payout	to	shareholders	in	the	form	of	dividends	and	share	buybacks	and	sluggish	investment	(Gruber	&	Kamin,	2015;	Gutiérrez	&	Philippon,	2016;	Lee,	Shin,	&	Stulz,	2016).	This	dimension	of	financialization	has	been	 linked	 in	 the	US	 to	GVC	participation	 to	 the	extent	 that	 large	oligopoly	 firms	manage	to	expand	their	profits	as	they	capture	value	through	cheaper	imports	(Auvray	&	Rabinovich,	2017;	W.	Milberg	&	Winkler,	2009;	William	Milberg,	2008).	Our	emphasis	on	intellectual	monopoly	pushes	the	argument	one	step	further:	monopoly	rents	arising	in	GVCs	 from	 IPRs	and	 the	 capture	of	network	externalities	enhance	market	power	of	lead	firms	also	encourage	financialization	and	put	a	drag	on	investment.		Monopolistic	 tendencies	 have	 long	 been	 linked	 to	 lower	 social	 welfare	 and	 declining	economic	growth	(Baran	&	Sweezy,	1966;	Shapiro,	1988;	Steindl,	1952).	As	they	acquire	market	power	 through	concentration,	oligopolistic	 firms	seek	 to	avoid	 the	danger	and	the	 cost	 of	 waging	 an	 uncertain	 competitive	 war	 and	 prefer	 instead	 to	 informally	coordinate	their	prices	with	their	main	competitors.	 	The	result	is	price	rigidity	and	an	adjustment	 to	 market	 conditions	 through	 capacity	 utilization.	 	 	 High	 profits	 and	 low	investment	go	hand-in-hand.	In	the	case	of	intellectual	monopolization	in	GVCs	there	are	two	main	 avenues	 for	 some	monopoly-stagnation	 dynamics.	 The	 first	 is	 the	 dearth	 of	investment	opportunities	arising	from	IPRs	(Pagano,	2014;	Pagano	&	Rossi,	2009).	The	second	is	the	endogenous	monopoly	dynamics	resulting	from	intangibles	circulation	in	GVCs.	 	Market	power	means	 limited	 competitive	pressure	on	 lead	 firms,	 so	 that	 these	firms	are	less	compelled	to	invest.		As	the	same	time,	current	high	rates	of	return	act	as	a	hurdle	rate,	limiting	the	opportunities	for	investment	by	potential	rivals.	Together,	these	two	mechanisms	can	contribute	to	low	reinvested	earnings	and	higher	financial	payout,	resuting	in	a	lower	rate	of	economic	growth	and	higher	inequality	of	income	and	wealth.		
5.3. 	Intangible	assets	and	tax	avoidance	in	GVCs		Another	related	issue	concerns	the	weakening	of	national	tax	bases.	At	the	beginning	of	the	2010s,	source	indicate	that	profit	shifting	was	costing	the	U.S.	government	between	$77	 and	 $130	 billion	 annually	 in	 corporate	 tax	 revenue.	 These	 revenue	 losses	 have	increased	significantly	over	time	since	close	to	40%	of	multinational	profits	are	shifted	to	low-tax	countries	each	year	(Clausing,	2016;	Tørsløv,	Wier,	&	Zucman,	2018;	Zucman,	
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2015).	 The	 lack	 of	 harmonization	 of	 tax	 structures	 among	 countries	 provides	opportunities	 to	 arbitrage	 tax	 regimes	 via	 transfer	 prices,	 countertrade,	 and	 multi-channel	remittance.	Information	systems	used	by	transnational	corporations	to	manage	GVCs	 can	 incorporate	 this	 information	 and	 automatically	 adjust	 the	 flow	 and	 transfer	prices	accordingly	(Prasad	&	Sounderpandian,	2003,	p.	243).		In	this	way,	GVC	trade	may		“hide,	obscure	and	relocate	wealth	to	the	extent	that	they	break	loose	from	the	location	of	 value	 creation	 and	 heighten	 inequality”	 (Seabrooke	 &	 Wigan,	 2017,	 p.	 257).		Intangibles	 are	 almost	 free	 from	 any	 constraint	 of	 localization,	 allowing	 lead	 firms	 to	fully	 exploit	 fiscal	 opportunities	 and	 nurture	 “Global	 Inequality	 Chains”	 (Quentin	 &	Campling,	 2018).	 For	 example,	 Apple	 transfers	 intellectual	 property,	 sales	 rights	 and	licensing	 rights	 to	 low	 tax	 jurisdictions,	 such	 as	 Ireland,	 and	 exploits	 international	regulatory	loopholes.	This	allows	the	corporation	to	accumulate	profit	there	and	shield	foreign	 income	 from	 tax	 payment,	 	 as	 the	 firm	diminishes	 it	 US	 profits	 by	 registering	60%	 (by	 2011)	 of	 its	 R&D	 expenses	 in	 these	 low	 tax	 jurisdictions	 (Wildauer	&	 Lopez	Bernardo,	2017).		Despite	the	intensifying	discussion	in	international	circles	on	the	issue	of	tax	avoidance,	research	by	the	Financial	Times	shows	that	the	effective	taxation	of	multinational	profits	fell	 in	 absolute	 terms	 by	 two	 percentage	 points	 in	 the	 decade	 from	2008	 (Toplensky,	2018).	 	 Rate	 cuts	 and	 the	 spreading	 of	 patent	 boxes	 that	 gives	 tax	 breaks	 for	 IP	 have	fueled	tax	competition	among	countries.	
6. Conclusion		Markets	for	intellectual	property	have	become	increasingly	subject	to	monopoly	power	in	the	past	10-15	years.		We	have	shown	that	this	has	both	contributed	to	the	expansion	of	 GVCs	 and	 at	 the	 same	 time	 to	 rising	 inequality	 of	 income	 distribution	 across	 and	within	 countries	 as	 a	 result	 of	 expanded	 trade	 in	 tasks.	 	 The	 tails	 of	 the	 smile	 curve	reflecting	 the	 international	 division	of	 labor	have	 steepened	because	of	 the	monopoly	power	of	those	controlling	IP	both	for	IP	products	and	for	the	non-fabrication	and	non-assemby	portions	of	the	value	chain	in	traditional	tangible	goods.	 	The	barrier	to	entry	from	intellectual	monopoly	further	depresses	the	value	of	 fabrication	and	assembly	by	adding	to	global	output	capacity.				The	 overall	 consequences	 of	 increasing	 GVC	 trade	 and	 stricter	 IPRs	 within	 GVCS	 for	developing	 countries	 are	 nonetheless	 ambiguous:	 	 on	 the	 one	 hand,	 IP	 protection	contributes	to	a	higher	return	on	the	control	of	intangible	assets	within	GVCs,	increasing	developing	 countries’	 opportunities	 for	 economic	 upgrading;	 on	 the	 other	 hand,	 this	comes	at	a	high	price	as	wider	and	stronger	intellectual	monopoly	rights	imply	greater	restriction	 on	 the	 scope	 of	 knowledge	 appropriation	 by	 developing	 countries,	 impose		entry	barriers	to	some	market	segments	and	spawn	rising	IP	payments.			
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The	 presence	 of	 network	 dynamics	 and	 scale	 economies	 give	 intellectual	 monopoly	today	an	entirely	new	significance	compared	to	the	the	traditional	world	of	intellectual	property.		And	intellectual	monopoly,	we	have	argued	is	central	to	the	life	and	dynamic	of	 GVCs.	 GVCs	 exhibit	 networks	 externalities	 arising	 from	 complementarities	 between	participants.	These	externalities	lead	to	a	highly	uneven	distribution	of	gains	because	of	(1)	the	gate-keeper	position	of	the	integrator,	(2)	the	firm’s	ability	to	capture	and	benefit	from	 the	 bulk	 of	 data	 generated	 by	 the	 software	 infrastructure	 that	 supports	 the	integration	and	(3)	the	uneven	distribution	of	returns	to	scale	depending	on	a	variation	in	the	degree	of	intangible-asset	intensity	across	firms	in	any	chain.		Policy	 implications	 of	 the	 analysis	 are	 beyond	 the	 scope	 of	 this	 paper.	 	 Intellectual	monopoly	 may	 require	 a	 regulatory	 response,	 as	 there	 may	 be	 considerable	 social	benefit	 from	weaker	 IPRs	 and	 data	 openness.	 The	 appropriate	 policy	 response	 to	 the	issues	 of	 complementarity	 and	 scalability	 of	 intangibles	 in	 GVCs	 requires	 further	analysis,	but	it	is	evident	that	there	is	a	need	to	take	into	account	network	externalities	because	they	entail	a	distinctive	process	of	knowledge	monopolization	compared	to	the	traditional	IP	regulatory	rationale.		
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